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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation interrogates the positionality of postconflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq 
within the broader discourse of the liberal peace and liberal reconstruction. It examines how 
U.S. policymakers planned and articulated the reconstruction of Iraq in relationship to 
historical examples, specifically the cases of West Germany and Japan. It questions how U.S. 
policymakers understood and utilized the examples of post-World War II reconstruction and 
the effect those examples had on the policymaking process. 
 
This dissertation traces the role historical memory plays in the formation and articulation of 
foreign policy by examining the use of historical analogies in planning the political, economic, 
and civil reconstruction of Iraq. It finds that the largest factor contributing to miscalculation in 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq was not conservative hawkishness, or liberal 
ineffectiveness, but rather a common mythology shared by many members of the U.S. foreign 
policy community, including the Bush administration, the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the most prominent Washington 
think tanks. 
 
This common mythology asserts that U.S. and Allied postwar reconstruction efforts in West 
Germany and Japan were unequivocal successes that led directly to the liberal democracies and 
neoliberal economies found today in Germany and Japan. This conventional wisdom shapes 
which policies appeared viable to U.S. policymakers, and resulted in undeserved optimism 
during the postwar planning for Iraq. This dissertation concludes that the lessons of 
postconflict reconstruction in Iraq remain contested. Lacklustre results in Iraq have not caused 
U.S. policymakers to re-evaluate their understanding of the U.S. role in postconflict 
reconstruction. Rather, the case of Iraq is being absorbed into the existing conventional 
wisdom, with believers in postconflict reconstruction claiming Iraq was simply planned poorly, 
or was not met with the kind of resources and commitment that could have led to success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
March 2013 saw the ten-year anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and launched a collective 
spate of reflection and commentary within the American political establishment. What lessons 
have been learned from the invasion and the subsequent ill-fated attempts at postconflict 
reconstruction? Are they the right lessons? Have they actually been “learned”? This discussion 
occurred across the pages of international and national newspapers, while Foreign Policy 
magazine and the Foreign Policy Initiative (among others) conducted roundtable debates 
devoted to exploring the motivations and effects of the American misadventure in Iraq. The 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise Institute, the Center 
for Global Development, the Center for National Policy, and Harvard University’s Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, among other policy think tanks and research 
institutions, released position papers, policy briefs, and editorial pieces debating all aspects of 
the subject.1 
 
This debate occurs amongst discussions about American foreign and domestic policy, but also 
across the borders of the concept of the liberal peace, or liberal reconstruction. As Mac Ginty 
and Richmond note, the liberal peace has, “become the de facto central organising framework 
for peace interventions and reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of contemporary civil 
wars.”2 To say as much is not to make the normative argument that postconflict reconstruction 
must, or even should, proceed along these lines; it is to note that state actors, non-
governmental organizations, and international institutions from the United Nations to the 
World Bank, have adopted procedures and best practices that conform, broadly speaking, to 
some combination of good-governance and neoliberal economics. These twin pillars of political 
and economic reconstruction tend to incorporate democratic governance (generally in the 
Western tradition), with an emphasis on human rights, the rule of law, and support for civil 
society. Economically, the agenda privileges market capitalism, and free and open trade 
relations. The tale of how this consensus arose is too long to recap here, but arguably its origins 
                                                
1 It should be noted that similar soul-searching occurred in the United Kingdom, where Chatham House, The 
Economist, and The New Statesman all issued special reports and editions evaluating the fall-out ten years after the 
invasion. The Huffington Post and The Independent both devoted extensive coverage to a public debate held at 
Goldsmiths, University of London. 
2 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, “Myth or Reality: Opposing Views on the Liberal Peace and Post-war 
Reconstruction,” Global Society 21:4 (2007): 492. 
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can be traced at least to 1914,3 if not well before, as the examples of the U.S. Civil War and the 
Boer War were followed by the first international reconstruction efforts following the First 
World War.4 
 
Supporters of the liberal peace look to it as the best framework for melding mediation and 
development, and thus alleviating the underdevelopment and political marginalization that 
may spark and fuel violence and interstate war. Detractors of the liberal peace consider it little 
more than window dressing for neo-colonial or neo-imperial aspirations by the Global North. 
They critique the ineffectiveness of a Western-centric (and state-centric) approach that relies 
too heavily on institutions, privileging form over function, to the detriment of human life. 
Other theorists attempt to bridge the gap between liberal peace advocates and their Critical 
and post-modern critics, attempting to reform rather than replace the current model of liberal 
reconstruction. As Williams has argued, “simple denunciations or weary acceptation of 
“reality” are simply not good enough.”5 
 
In the United States, an international relations discourse dominated by rationalism and 
positivism often utilizes empirical case studies as part of this debate. These scholars attempt to 
draw conclusions from historical examples, working to isolate variables that contribute to—or 
detract from—the success of reconstruction missions. A reoccurring debate within the literature 
on postconflict reconstruction centres on how certain cases can or should be classified. Should 
cases of international trusteeship or administration fall in the same category as unilateral or 
multilateral projects conducted by individual nations or “coalitions of the willing”? Should past 
colonial projects be considered in the same category as post-Cold War nation building? 
Although the debate is not surprising, failure to agree which cases are relevant makes 
subsequent discussion disjointed. In the more than ten years since the 2003 U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, many authors have grappled with the problem of how to understand Iraq in this broader 
and longer context of U.S. and international postconflict reconstruction efforts across the 
world. 
                                                
3 Adam Quinn and Michael Cox, “For Better, for Worse: How America's Foreign Policy became Wedded to 
Liberal Universalism,” Global Society 21:4 (2007): 499-519. 
4 Andrew Williams, “Reconstruction Before the Marshall Plan,” Review of International Studies Vol. 31, No. 3 (July 
2005): 541-558. 
5 Andrew Williams, “Reconstruction: The Bringing of Peace and Plenty or Occult Imperialism?” Global Society 
21:4 (2007): 539. 
  3 
Iraq as Exception: Liberal Proponents 
 
Some supporters of liberal reconstruction are resistant to viewing U.S. operations in Iraq as 
part of the larger history of liberal reconstruction. If Iraq is an exception, then the broader 
course of liberal reconstruction can continue unsullied. Samuels and von Einsiedel isolate Iraq 
on the basis of the coalition—or lack thereof—that undertook its reconstruction. They draw a 
distinction between unilateral and multilateral reconstruction projects, arguing “the lesson 
from Iraq, at least in relation to state-building, may well be that such interventions are so 
exceptionally difficult and politically sensitive that only a body with broad international and 
local legitimacy stands a good chance of success.”6 By classifying Iraq as a unilateral, rather than 
multilateral endeavour, Samuels and von Einsiedel can argue for salvaging the course of liberal 
reconstruction as a legitimate and useful exercise, if only it is undertaken in a multilateral 
manner with broad international support. 
 
Other proponents of the liberal peace draw lessons from the Iraq experience in an effort to 
improve liberal reconstruction efforts. Bellin points to historical, contextual, and operational 
characteristics that distinguish reconstruction in Iraq from international efforts elsewhere.7 
Critiquing the comparison between reconstruction efforts in Iraq and postwar reconstruction 
in West Germany and Japan, Bellin concludes the cases of Bosnia and Haiti are more 
comparable, and argues for extended—rather than brief—interventions. Rathmell’s analysis of 
Iraq’s reconstruction under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) can be read in a similar 
vein; he uses the case of Iraq to suggest improvements to the project of liberal reconstruction.8 
Still others have focused on the importance of intention and motive, seeking to distinguish 
operations in Iraq from previous military interventions in an effort to salvage the project of the 
liberal peace by removing the ethical baggage of the Iraq intervention. Glaser’s effort to “Iraq-
proof” a doctrine of just military intervention is a prime example of this strain of the 
discourse.9 
                                                
6 Kirsty Samuels and Samuel von Einsiedel, “The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational 
Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq,” IPA State-Building Program Policy Report, (2003): 2. 
7 Eva Bellin, “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Political Science 
Quarterly 119:4 (Winter 2004/2005): 595-608. 
8 Andrew Rathmell, “Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?” International Affairs 81:5 
(2005): 1013-1038. 
9 Daryl Glaser, “Can the doctrine of just military intervention survive Iraq?” Journal of Global Ethics 6:3 (2010): 
287-304. 
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Iraq as Example: Liberal Detractors 
 
Critics of liberal reconstruction are keen to view the case of Iraq as an example, rather than 
exception, to the course of post-conflict reconstruction. Detractors of the liberal peace argue 
the case of Iraq harbours marked similarities to other historical case studies, and view it as yet 
another example of the damaging effects of liberal peace ideology. Jacoby fiercely stakes out this 
position, arguing the aim of reconstruction is to repress genuine democratic mobilization and 
advance the aims of hegemonic and imperial ambition.10 Lachler concurs, albeit less 
colourfully, noting, “What we see at work in Iraqi reconstruction as in other interventions in 
conflict, post-conflict, or non-conflict settings is the reproduction and expansion of a 
hegemonic international order.”11 
 
This view is not limited to post-structuralist and critical opponents of the liberal peace, 
however. Quinn and Cox, Mac Ginty and Richmond, and Williams are sagely aware of the 
problems of the liberal peace. They note the liberal peace’s vulnerability to charges of 
imperialism; the ofttimes non-democratic nature of the liberal market economy; the tensions 
between “benign hegemony”, empire, and imperialism.12 However, these historically minded 
advocates of the liberal peace still ascribe some merit to aspects of U.S. interventions, however 
problematic, arguing the current version of liberal reconstruction is preferable to the 
alternatives of dissolving states or perpetual war. 
 
The positionality of Iraq with respect to the history of postconflict reconstruction remains 
contested. Proponents of the liberal peace have not managed to successfully articulate a version 
of that school of thought that can adequately defend against charges of neo-imperialism or self-
serving hegemony. Detractors of the liberal peace have a strong case in citing Iraq as an 
exemplary model of the end result of neoliberal intervention, but their critiques have little 
constructive guidance to impart to policymakers seeking solutions to very present challenges. 
This is not a new dilemma, but rather one original to the cause of liberalism. To oversimplify: 
Locke may have argued that all men must be free, and Kant may have hoped that freedom 
                                                
10 Tim Jacoby, “Hegemony, Modernisation and Post-war Reconstruction,” Global Society, 21:4 (2007): 521-537. 
11 Wolfram Lachler. “Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-conflict Reconstruction?” International 
Peacekeeping Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 2007): 247. 
12 Quinn and Cox, “For Better, for Worse,” 499-519; Mac Ginty and Richmond, “Myth or Reality,” 491-497; 
Andrew Williams, Liberalism and War (New York: Routledge, 2006), 203-214. 
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would bring peace, but Mill would always maintain that freed men will not always choose 
peace, and that freedom could never be imposed. As Walzer argues, “[A community] cannot be 
set free, as [an individual] cannot be made virtuous, by any external force.13  To paraphrase 
Lachler, what is at stake in arguments about the exceptionality or exemplarity of Iraq is nothing 
less than the rationale and genealogy of the postconflict peacebuilding agenda as a whole.14 
 
This project examines the positionality of postconflict reconstruction in Iraq through the 
discourse of the U.S. policy elite in advance of the 2003 invasion. Many authors have 
examined the intentions and ideologies of various individuals and entities within the Bush 
administration,15 and journalistic accounts chronicling the lead-up to the invasion and the 
subsequent occupation are valuable sources.16 However, a comprehensive analysis of discourse 
within and without the administration has not occurred. Although the pre-invasion discourse 
of U.S. policymakers is replete with reference to historical cases of liberal reconstruction, the 
way policymakers compared their efforts in Iraq to the broader history of the liberal peace has 
not been examined. 
Research Quest ions  
 
In an effort to understand the positionality of postconflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq, this 
project examines how key voices in the American political sphere planed and articulated the 
reconstruction of Iraq in relationship to historical examples. More specifically, how did the 
U.S. discourse of postconflict reconstruction prior to the 2003 invasion utilize the cases of 
West Germany and Japan? Do understandings of post-World War II reconstruction in the U.S. 
discourse prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion reflect the original goals of those projects? These 
questions speak to issues of the liberal peace, as well as liberal reconstruction, but also to the 
                                                
13 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2nd 
edition, 1992), 87. 
14 Lachler, “Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-conflict Reconstruction?” 247. 
15 See, for example, Toby Dodge, “The ideological roots of failure: the application of kinetic neo-liberalism to 
Iraq,” International Affairs 86:6 (2010): 1269-1286; Toby Dodge, “Enemy Images, Coercive Socio-Engineering and 
Civil War in Iraq,” International Peacekeeping 19:4 (2012): 461-477. 
16 Works consulted for this project include Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad’s 
Green Zone (London: Bloomsbury, 2007); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of 
the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Vintage Books, 2007); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American 
Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Allen Lane, 2006); Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 2004). 
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formation and articulation of foreign policy goals, and the importance of institutional and 
cultural memory in foreign policy making. 
Historical Analogy: Legitimation or Conceptualisation 
 
How did the U.S. discourse of postconflict reconstruction prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion utilize the cases 
of West Germany and Japan? 
 
Political leaders often use historical analogy in policy articulation, but is this a way of making 
sense of the challenges they face, or merely a rhetorical tool of policy legitimation? Yuen Foong 
Khong’s Analogies at War argues the answer is both: in the case of the U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam, American policy makers used historical analogy to make sense of the conflict, and as 
evidence for their preferred policies.17 In the case of Iraq, if historical analogy served primarily 
a tool of policy legitimation, the use of historical analogies may be present in documents 
directed at the public, but absent from the administration’s internal debates. Conversely, 
employment of historical analogy as a means of understanding new policy challenges should 
evidence similarities in historical reasoning across an administration’s public and private 
discourse. 
Debating Intention: Memory and Mythology 
 
Do understandings of post-World War II reconstruction in the U.S. discourse prior to the 2003 Iraq 
invasion reflect the original goals of those projects? 
 
Some authors have explicitly (or implicitly) analysed reconstruction cases on the basis of 
intention. In U.S. postconflict reconstruction discourse from 2003, Dobbins et al. discard 
projects in the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada, and 
Panama from their analysis of U.S. postconflict reconstruction on the basis of intention: the 
Philippines because the project “was intended to span several generations,” and the later cases 
because of “more limited objectives”.18 Fukuyama notes, “the logic of this argument is not 
                                                
17 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 251-254. 
18 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
2003), 27. 
  7 
clear,”19 while Jason Brownlee and Greg Grandin both critique this tendency at length. 
Grandin argues analytic comparisons of state reconstruction that focus unduly on West 
Germany and Japan “consistently ignore the one place where the United States has projected 
its influence for more than two centuries,” i.e. Latin America.20 Brownlee notes, “If the leading 
studies of nation-building have selected an unrepresentative sample, the lessons they draw may 
be commensurately skewed.21 
 
Authors arguing in favour of multilateral postconflict reconstruction and against unilateral 
policies have divided cases similarly. This is arguably an attempt to draw a distinction between 
“intervention” and “reconstruction” with the former being an exercise in (often unilateral) 
realist power projection, and the latter an (often multilateral) attempt to create a liberal, 
democratic regime in the Western model. This distinction is a result of the gradual evolution 
and melding of theories of peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian intervention.22 
Earlier practice aimed at intervention, with an eventual, possibly long-term, by-product of 
democratic governance. Today, reconstruction aims at more immediate democratic results.23 
Because the goals of interventions (or reconstructions) have changed with time, distinguishing 
and evaluating case studies on the basis of intention can only be valuable if grounded in 
accurate historical analysis. The U.S. literature from prior to the invasion of Iraq ignores 
critical nuance from the cases of West Germany and Japan, not only in terms of what 
policymakers in the postwar period intended to achieve, but also what their policies 
accomplished. Rather, the U.S. literature from this period seems to suffer from reading Cold 
War justifications and later historical developments back onto policies enacted in the postwar 
era. Re-examining the cases of West Germany and Japan brings necessary variance back into 
the postconflict reconstruction debate, and highlights the danger of distinguishing and 
evaluating cases on the basis of poorly understood intentions. 
                                                
19 Fukuyama, “Introduction: Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” 2. 
20 Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2010), 1-2. 
21 Jason Brownlee, “Review Article: Can America Nation-Build” World Politics Vol. 59, No. 2 (January 2007) 320. 
22 Williams, Liberalism and War, 126-130; Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams, Conflict and Development (New 
York; Routledge, 2009), 122-131. 
23 Jason Brownlee, “Review Article: Can America Nation-Build,” World Politics Vol. 59, No. 2 (January 2007): 315-
317; Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by force: A renewed commitment to nation building,” The Washington 
Quarterly 23:1 (2000): 96. 
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Theoret ical  Approach 
 
The collective pantheon of international relations theories endows scholars with a plethora of 
choices when it comes to ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches. I have 
drawn on the work of several constructivist and post-structural theorists who have worked to 
articulate a middle ground between the politically conscious critiques of critical theory and 
post-structuralism, and the linguistically focused and intersubjective views of some strains of 
constructivism. This project draws from the nexus of poststructuralist, critical, and 
constructivist thought, particularly the work of thinkers such as Thierry Balzaq, Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson, and Karin M. Fierke. I ascribe to the general constructivist maxim that any 
reality worth speaking of is necessarily socially constructed, and also that the observer is 
necessarily part and parcel of their own social constructions. However, I hope to avoid the 
rationalist and positivist pitfalls that underlie much of Alexander Wendt’s constructivist 
articulations, thereby avoiding essentialism, and preserving the emphasis on agency and 
causality that is so crucial to critical research in the social sciences. Fierke terms this approach 
“consistent constructivism”,24 while Jackson describes his approach as “transactional social 
constructionist” in the post-structural vein.25 Some may question the efficacy or intellectual 
stability of this approach, and I hope to address those concerns in the following pages. 
 
During the 1980s, discussions of ontology and epistemology in the discipline of international 
relations centred around the “Third Debate”, wherein post-positivists contested the dominance 
and utility of rationalist and realist thought, and challenged the failure of positivist theory to 
adequately predict or explain change and historical contingency.26 As a result of these critiques, 
constructivism became more enmeshed in the theoretical topography of international relations 
discourse, particularly following Wendt’s work attempting to bridge rationalist and 
constructivist paradigms.27 Fierke notes Wendt’s attempt tacks very near to positivism and 
rationalism by (1) insisting on a distinction between the ideational and material, (2) pursuing 
                                                
24 Karin M. Fierke, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne et 
al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 196. 
25 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of The West (Ann Arbour: 
University of Michigan Press, 2006), 15. 
26 Karin M. Fierke, “Critical Methodology and Constructivism,” in Constructing International Relations: the next 
generation, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 115. 
27 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425. 
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causal explanations and (3) emphasizing the role of action rather than language.28 While 
Wendt’s theorization rejects immutable manifestations of identity, and thus permits states to 
construct and alter the rules of the system on a social basis, these forces are shaped by 
putatively exogenous systemic anarchy. The assumption of anarchy foregrounds Wendt’s causal 
argument, and thus infringes on claims he might make to preserving agency. Wendt’s 
articulation is focused on action and deed, ignoring the medium of language through which 
social actions are articulated and understood. 
Preserving the Intersubjective 
 
The attempt by some constructivists to distinguish between the “ideational” and the “material” 
tracks closely to positivist orthodoxy and is inconsistent with the intersubjective foundations of 
constructivism.29 Just as rationalism and realism can be criticized for privileging putatively 
exogenous interests in a material sense, so too some iterations of constructivism have privileged 
putatively exogenous interests in an ideational one. Neither approach holds true to the 
intersubjective basis of constructivism, wherein “Intersubjectivity is a dialogical relationship in 
so far as meaning and practices arise out of interaction.”30 
 
Replacing a relationship between material factors and outcomes with a causal relationship 
between ideational factors and outcomes is not consistent with intersubjectivity. Such an 
approach robs actors of their historical context and thus draws a distorted view of agency. 
Wendt’s acceptance of the state as a unitary actor is emblematic of this issue, for if states 
behave as unitary actors it becomes difficult to understand the actions of individuals within 
their own historical context. This project attempts to contextualize actors within the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment within their own discourse. By viewing discourse and policy 
outcomes as part and parcel of one another, I hope to avoid essentialism of either intention or 
identity, and preserve the role of agency in policy making. 
 
                                                
28 Fierke, “Critical Methodology and Constructivism,” 116-117. 
29 Fierke, “Critical Methodology and Constructivism,” 116-117; David Campbell, “Epilogue: The Disciplinary 
Politics of Theorizing Identity,” in Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised 
edition, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 207-228. 
30 Fierke, “Critical Methodology and Constructivism,” 117. 
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Foregrounding Ontology 
 
Some delineate the divide between rationalism and reflectivism at primarily an epistemological 
and methodological (rather than ontological) level.31 Kurki and Wight explain that concerns 
about knowing are the drivers in the ultimate decision about what can be known, thus, “The 
explanatory theorist reduces the ontological complexity of the social world to those aspects of it 
that can be observed and measured. Thus the ontology adopted by this approach is shaped by 
epistemological and methodological concerns.”32 It is perhaps true that the explanatory, 
rationalist, and/or positivist theorist follows this method, but it is far from certain that 
theorists hoping to contextualize actors in a social context have necessarily arrived at their 
decision in the same way. 
 
A social ontology should necessitate a social epistemology and methodology, and vice versa. 
However, it is conceivable that a purposefully positivist ontology could chose to adopt a social 
epistemology. This, some would argue, is precisely what Wendt has done. Just as Weber’s ideas 
of Erklären and Verstehen have framed much of the “Third Debate” about positivism and post-
positivism, so too Wittgenstein’s work has been used to frame the subsequent “linguistic turn” 
in international relations specifically and social science more generally. As Fierke notes, “a 
constructivist epistemology, as a product of the linguistic turn, builds on the notion that we 
cannot get behind our language to compare it which that which it describes (Wittgenstein 
1958). Language is bound up in the world rather than a mirror of it.”33 In Fierke’s 
understanding, the epistemological construction is decidedly a product of a specific ontological 
understanding; the latter necessarily precedes the former. By pairing a social ontology with a 
social constructivist epistemology, I hope to retain intellectual consistency in my analysis of 
U.S. discourse surrounding Iraq reconstruction, and thus avoid the positivist assumptions of 
other strains of constructivism. 
 
                                                
31 Steve Smith, “Introduction,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, edited by Tim Dunne, 
Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5; and Milija Kurki and Colin Wight, 
“International Relations and Social Science,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, edited by 
Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 34-51. 
32 Kurki and Wight, “International Relations and Social Science,” 20. 
33 Fierke, “Constructivism,” 194. 
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Possibilities of Language – Impossibilities of Determining Intention 
 
Wittgenstein argues we cannot get behind our language; that, in fact, there is no way of 
knowing, or understanding, or even speaking about that which we cannot articulate. Fierke’s 
consistent constructivism challenges the idea that language is merely a set of labels for objective 
reality or the objective intentions of individual actors. Instead, “An approach to language as 
rule-based requires that we ‘look and see’ how language is put to use by social actors as they 
construct their world.”34 Jackson similarly argues that he cannot and is not trying to speak 
about the intention of actors, because he could never do so.35 Intentions cannot be 
determined, because they cannot be separated from the language used to articulate them. In a 
world that is explicitly ontologically constructed, it follows that our epistemology and 
methodology need to follow from our understanding of the world. One cannot argue for a 
socially constructed world, and then speak to tangible and essentialist identity, motives, or 
intention. This project will thus speak to rules rather than causes, to articulated positions 
rather than intention. 
Methodological  Approach 
 
Having laid the ontological basis for an understanding of the world, it is important to speak 
now to epistemological considerations. As noted above, this follows necessarily from an 
ontological understanding, such that the so-called ‘Fourth Debate’ is as much between 
rationalists and reflexivists as it is over the boundaries between constructivism and critical 
theory. Two clear examples of this process are Emmanuel Alder’s efforts to distinguish 
constructivism from its poststructuralist companions,36 and David Campbell’s articulation of 
poststructuralism against constructivism.37 These debates have challenged weaknesses in 
Wendt’s brand of constructivism, pointing to an inherent positivism that remains responsible 
for the reification of realist practice and the consolidation of existing power structures.38 
                                                
34 Fierke, “Constructivism,” 197. 
35 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 46 and 251. 
36 Emmanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of 
International Relations 3:3 (1997): 319-363. 
37 Campbell, “Epilogue,” 207-228. 
38 Fierke, “Critical Methodology and Constructivism,” 115. 
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Subsequent challenges involve attempts to delineate the boundaries between a positivist 
constructivism and a more critical (and politically conscious) post-structuralism.39 
 
Jackson has taken this line of critique even further in his analysis of post-World War II 
reconstruction. Realist and rationalist perspectives rely heavily on exogenously specified 
interests, but as Wendt has noted, this makes it difficult (if not impossible) for such theoretical 
lenses to account for or predict change. The end of the Cold War is the clearest example of 
this predictive failure, but the critique applies to other rationalist projects in which interests are 
either assumed as given, or extrapolated from material or systemic factors. Certain veins of 
constructivism have also encountered this problem; those who focus on identity, or norms, 
inevitably identify interests that are produced exogenously. As Jackson notes, a focus on 
putatively exogenous interests—be they material or ideational—may ignore much of the 
dynamism and ambiguity of social reality and “account for social stability in terms that are 
ultimately non-social—and therefore deny that social action can alter interests.”40 Such 
theorization is not only determinist, and thus ignores agency, but it also eliminates social 
aspects of causality. 
The Unimportance of “Belief” 
 
Jackson proposes a “meso” explanation that focuses not on the decisions or interests of 
individual actors, but rather on how the development and deployment of rhetorical strategies 
created social dynamics that resulted in the formulation of certain policies. Jackson notes: 
 
The object of explanation here is not individual decisions or behaviours; my account is 
(deliberately) unable to definitively explain why Konrad Adenauer or Dean Acheson as 
individuals oriented their activities toward ‘the West’ as opposed to adopting some very 
different social goal. Such as biographical or psychological explanation, although 
interesting in its own right, is not strictly necessary to an explanation of social 
arrangements that focuses on concatenations of social practice. Concentrating on the 
                                                
39 For an excellent (and entertaining) example of this continuing debate, see the four back-to-back reviews 
conducted by Colin Wight and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson in Cooperation and Conflict 43 (2008) 341-360. 
40 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 246. 
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motives of individuals is a very different analytical exercise that concentrating on the 
social conditions of possibility that make social action possible.41 
 
By focusing on social concatenations rather than material or ideal interests, Jackson also avoids 
rationalist and realist critiques that would question the objective “truth” of statements or 
articulations by policymakers. Such an account is neither concerned with, nor reliant on 
whether policymakers truly “believe” their rhetoric. The importance of the articulation is that 
it exists as such; that it has been related to a specific audience for a specific policy purpose. 
Jackson’s “Rhetorical Commonplaces” 
 
Jackson argues policy articulations are constrained by prior articulations and the reasonable 
expectations of the audience. Thus, “public officials cannot simply say anything that they like 
in defense of a policy” because “each set of speakers, audience, and issues is characterized by a 
group of rhetorical commonplaces on which speakers can draw with any hope of having the 
audience follow their arguments, let alone be moved to action by them.” Jackson is interested 
not only in how the rhetorical commonplace of ‘Western Civilization’ was created, but also 
how it became part of the postwar public discourse in the United States and Germany. With 
respect to the discourse surrounding postconflict reconstruction in Iraq prior to the 2003 
invasion, I am interested only in how the rhetorical commonplace of post-World War II 
reconstruction success became part of the discourse and how it was used. The question of how 
such a commonplace came about is no doubt important, and rooted firmly in American 
historiography of the postwar and Cold War periods. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, 
such an investigation could not be attempted for this project. 
Critiques of the “Cultural Approach” 
 
This method of analyzing and describing discourse and memory is not without its critiques. 
Blydenburg, in his review of Jan-Werner’s Memory and Power in Post-War Europe argues that 
certain elements of the “cultural approach” (or, for my purposes, the constructivist approach) 
are equally culpable of the essentialism found in positivist social science approaches.42 
Blydenburg argues that by holding culture, discourse, or memory as an independent variable 
                                                
41 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 251. 
42 John C. Blydenburg, “Memory and Power in Post-War Europe by Jan-Werner Muller, Review,” Political 
Psychology Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2003): 851. 
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subject to study, the authors have infringed upon the assumptions of individual agency and 
responsibility that they sought to preserve. Thus, “the culture made me do it” (or in this case, 
the discourse) unwittingly maintains aspects of positivist determinism that constructivism seeks 
to avoid. 
 
Colin Wight’s review of Jackson’s Civilizing the Enemy makes a similar critique, arguing Jackson 
has unwittingly reintroduced not only an essentialist definition of civilization, but also a focus 
on motive and intention.43 Jackson’s escape is that he has attempted to define his concepts in 
the terms that his actors understand them. Thus, for Jackson, Adenauer, Schumaker, Marshall, 
and Dulles carry with them largely similar, but still unique, articulations of what ‘Western 
Civilization’ is, and what it means to function as part of it. That they use the same language 
does not necessitate that they mean the same thing, and Jackson is careful not to conflate those 
two positions. Jackson argues the issue of belief or intention is not one that can be answered, 
but as policy debates are never starkly separated positions that speak only in opposition to each 
other, it need not be. As Jackson notes, purely oppositional positions cannot engage in 
dialogue, as they have nothing whatsoever in common.44 By focusing on the common 
touchstones of the debate, or the “rhetorical commonplaces” which various viewpoints touch 
upon, we can better understand the way in which all participants viewed the world, and thus 
how policy evolved in reaction to their perception of the problem they faced. This sort of 
analysis better encapsulates the vagaries of the policymaking process, as well as the underlying 
worldview such a process reflects. Whether actors “truly believe” in the discourse and rhetorical 
commonplaces they are deploying is beside the point; by the very act of deploying them they 
are speaking not only to the previous discourse of their opponents, but also to the audience 
that is consuming and responding to their speech. Actors operating in a different social reality, 
supported by a different worldview, would necessarily deploy different rhetorical strategies. 
 
Blydenburg also critiques the political change agenda of such an epistemological approach. His 
critique of the concept of memory is equally applicable to Jackson’s conception of discourse 
and rhetorical commonplaces; therefore I shall quote it in full: 
 
                                                
43 Colin Wight, “Back-To-Back Review: Motives, Essentialism and Defending the West Pole,” Cooperation and 
Conflict 43 (2008) 348. 
44 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 46. 
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No stand is taken on the authenticity of memory: Memory does not have to be the 
result of direct experience or observation, it does not have to be contemporary, and it 
can be entirely fabricated. If there is no way—even in theory—of establishing whether a 
memory is anchored in fact, because all facts are the product of culture, there is no 
basis for judging a memory to be false; memory is merely an instrument of those who 
control the means to its production. This point of view, de facto, legitimizes the power 
of those who have the means to create “memory” in the same way that the empirical 
movement has legitimized policy by polling. By this argument historians are only 
interpreting observers. Who then should have power? The intellectuals who write essays 
about memory?45 
 
Blydenburg’s point is well taken. If discourse and memory can be fabricated and ahistorical, is 
there merit to Jackson’s recontextualization of policymaking during and after World War II? 
Similar questions can be raised about a project that aims to contextualize policymaking in 
advance of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Fortunately, Fierke provides us with a response to this 
critique: 
 
Description, while not inherently critical, becomes so if it makes us look again, in a 
fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it has become overly 
familiar. Taking seriously the criteria for describing contexts, such as the end of the 
Cold War, or the conflict in Bosnia, opens up the prospect of challenging realist 
accounts of these changes. In this way, new spaces are opened for thinking about the 
past and the present and, therefore, how we construct the future.46 
 
Analyzing the discourse of postconflict planning for the U.S. invasion of Iraq provides nuance 
that enhances our understanding of policy creation, articulation, and legitimation. Examining 
the positionality of Iraq from the perspective of those planning the invasion and subsequent 
reconstruction will deliver important conclusions about Iraq’s exceptionality or exemplarity in 
terms of historical memory and future ‘lessons learned’. 
                                                
45 Blydenburg, “Memory and Power,” 852. 
46 Fierke, “Critical Methodology and Constructivism,” 122. 
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Empirical  Source Material  
 
Three distinct sources of material were examined over the course of this project: internal U.S. 
federal documentation, public statements by government officials, and publications by key U.S. 
think tanks and research institutions. Each category of source material possesses different 
strengths and weaknesses, which will be noted throughout and are discussed generally below. 
 
Internal U.S. federal documentation was drawn primarily from the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Since the end of the Bush 
administration, many of the documents relevant to the planning and conduct of the invasion 
of Iraq have been made public under the Freedom of Information Act or other declassification 
procedures. Furthermore, with the establishment of The George W. Bush Presidential Library 
and the with the release of Donald Rumsfeld’s autobiography Known and Unknown more 
documents, including many of the internal “snowflake” memos, are available online.47 
 
Internal documents made public through formal declassification procedures or leaking present 
a valuable window into the inner discourse shaping the Bush administration’s decisions with 
respect to the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq. However, it is important to recognize that 
these documents represent at best an incomplete version of events, and at worst a decidedly 
slanted one. The documents released in connection with Rumsfeld’s memoir are open to 
critiques of being selected to support his particular narrative of events. Equally, the Obama 
administration’s declassifications could be tinged with political motivation. Released in 
isolation and removed of much of their context, some will dispute their authenticity or 
completeness. Internal documents are valuable, but in themselves they are insufficient to 
construct a complete picture of U.S. establishment’s discourse during the period in question. 
 
To supplement these gaps, the public statements of government officials were also reviewed, 
including key speeches by senior officials, and relevant statements and press releases from the 
Public Affairs offices of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the White 
House. Given the rigorous and collective nature of government clearance and messaging, 
formal public declarations by government officials can be assumed to broadly represent the 
                                                
47 Donald Rumsfeld, “The Rumsfeld Papers,” http://papers.rumsfeld.com. 
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collective position of a majority of actors within the bureaucracy. As public declarations can 
often seem both an appeal to the lowest common denominator, and an attempt to be seen 
saying something without really saying much of anything, it would be difficult to determine 
much useful information from public declarations alone. However, when combined with 
private documentation and broader discourse from outside the administration, public 
declarations present important data points in a larger representation of elite discourse. 
Moreover, a comparison of historical analogies present in internal and external documents 
helps determine if the use of the rhetorical commonplace of post-World War II reconstruction 
success is merely a rhetorical tool of policy legitimation. 
 
The third category of documents consulted during this research is publications by key U.S. 
think tanks and research institutes, including contract research organizations and academic 
foreign policy think tanks. In an effort to provide a holistic analysis of the American political 
establishment, the largest and most influential institutions from across the political spectrum 
were selected. The target institutions are listed below.48 
 
Name of Institution Type Ideological Affiliation 
American Enterprise Institute Academic-diversified Conservative 
Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy 
Advocacy Center-Right 
RAND Corporation Contract Research Center-Right 
Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
Academic-diversified Center-Right 
Council on Foreign Relations Academic-specialized Centrist 
James Baker Institute Academic-diversified Centrist 
Stimson Center Academic-diversified Centrist 
Brookings Institution Academic-diversified Center-Left 
New American Foundation Academic-diversified Center-Left 
Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 
Academic-specialized Center-Left 
Center for American Progress Academic-diversified Progressive 
United States Institute of Peace Academic-specialized Progressive 
                                                
48 The ideological affiliations listed above are largely representative of common perceptions within the United 
States, though individual analysts often express views significantly “right” or “left” of their institution. Moreover, 
the centre of the U.S. political establishment is decidedly more conservative than that of its British or European 
counterparts, so while the products of Carnegie or the U.S. Institute of Peace are often decidedly “progressive” by 
American terms, they may barely count as centrist in British or continental fora. Institution type and ideological 
classification adopted from James G. McGann, “Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US,” (Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2005), 6-13. 
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A Note on Terminology  
 
Throughout this dissertation I have endeavoured to maintain a distinction between 1) the 
German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik), centred in East Berlin 
from 1949 to 1990, and popularly known as East Germany, 2) the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland), established in Bonn in 1949, and popularly known 
as West Germany, and 3) the unified Federal Republic of Germany, which has existed since 
reunification in 1990. Many sources confuse the issue, often referring to the U.S. and/or 
Allied reconstruction of “Germany” when they really mean the portions of Western Germany 
under U.S. and/or Allied control after 1945. I attempted to maintain this distinction clearly in 
my analysis. The terminology used by a source has been retained in quotes. 
 
This dissertation follows on the work of earlier authors, and intentionally uses the term ‘state 
reconstruction’.49 The term was chosen over other, perhaps more familiar, terms such as 
‘nation building’ or ‘state building’ for several reasons. ‘Nation building’ and ‘state building’ 
are distinct terms, with the former referring to the construction of cultural, linguistic, or ethnic 
entities, and the latter more narrowly focusing on the construction of political structures. Both 
terms are at times used interchangeably, and both tend toward the linguistic assumption that 
new structures must be constructed within the subject state as a result of the failure, or 
absence, of effective organizing institutions. Even if unintentionally, such terms encourage 
policymakers to ignore pre-existing social, economic, and political structures, which are often 
informal, and may be poorly understood by external actors. 
 
Another difficulty lies in the propensity of various authors to use different terms, as well as to 
define those terms differently. RAND utilizes the term ‘nation-building’ as the use of “military 
force to underpin a process of democratization”.50 CEIP’s definition follows this closely; Pei 
and Kasper defined ‘nation-building’ as “the promotion or imposition of democratic 
institutions desired by American policy makers”. Their chosen cases also require the aim of 
“regime change or regime survival”, the “deployment of large numbers of U.S. ground troops”, 
and the role of “American military and civilian personnel in the political administration” of 
                                                
49 See for example, Charles Tripp, “After Saddam,” Survival 44:4 (Winter 2002-2003): 24-25; Roger Mac Ginty, 
“The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq,” Third World Quarterly 24:4 (2003): 604-605. 
50 Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building, 26-27. 
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the state in question.51 The RAND definition requires democratization as a goal, whereas CEIP 
requires it for a successful outcome. Licklider eschews the question of democratization entirely. 
Instead he defines state-building as “the construction of political institutions and a viable 
political order”, but notes that in the post-Cold War period, state-building commonly blends 
with peacekeeping.52 Conversely, Mac Ginty prefers to maintain a distinction between broad 
terms such as development and peacebuilding, and more specified terms such as postwar 
recovery, rehabilitation, rebuilding, and reconstruction.53 
 
Challenges with the terms ‘state building’ and ‘nation building’ have been noted above, but 
terms which assume undeveloped or absent state structures are particularly unsuitable with 
respect to Iraq.54 Political, economic, and cultural structures linked the region of what would 
become Iraq to the Ottoman Empire for 400 years prior to the end of World War I. Following 
the war, the 1920 Treaty of Sevres divided the Ottoman Empire, and the modern borders of 
Iraq were drawn into a mandate under British control. Iraq became independent from Britain 
in 1932, and reformed as a republic following the liquidation of the monarchy in 1958. Under 
the Ba’ath party, and later Saddam Hussein, Iraq entered a period of centralized rule, wherein 
organizing ties of influence and patronage extended deep into Iraq’s society. Fukuyama claims 
of Iraq, that “after the United States-led invasion, no state infrastructure existed to provide 
security or to distribute state services.”55 This assertion is flawed. Similar to other states in the 
region, the levers of power in Iraq gradually formed what Trip has termed a ‘dual-’ or ‘shadow-
state’.56 Although this shadow structure was not clearly visible to U.S. policymakers, it 
remained in place despite Saddam’s removal from power. U.S. planners may have felt they 
were working with a blank slate, but prior structures and informal connections continued to 
shape civil, economic, and political relations in Iraq. 
More utilitarian or functional terms, such as ‘postwar’, or ‘postconflict reconstruction’ call to 
mind the nuts and bolts of refurbishment or reconstruction of infrastructural damage caused 
                                                
51 Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building,” Policy Brief 
24, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (May 2003): 1-2. 
52 Roy Licklider, “The American Way of State Building: Germany, Japan, Somalia and Panama,” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1999): 82. 
53 Mac Ginty, “The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq,” 604. 
54 Sultan Barakat, “Post-Saddam Iraq: deconstruction a regime, reconstructing a nation,” Third World Quarterly 
26:4-5 (2005): 573-575. 
55 Francis Fukuyama, “Introduction: Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory,” in Nation-Building: 
Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, edited by Francis Fukuyama, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 6. 
56 For further explanation of Iraq’s ‘shadow-state’, see Tripp, “After Saddam,” 25-31. 
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by internal conflict, or inter-state war. These terms are often held synonymous with 
‘development’, and fail to encompass the less tangible aspects of economic, social, and political 
recovery in the wake of conflict. Such terms also assume a clear distinction between a period of 
conflict, and a subsequent ‘postconflict’ phase. In practice, the aftermath of conflict can be 
every bit as destabilizing and uncertain as the earlier conflict, and the effects of war or inter-
communal violence can take many generations to subside. Similarly, the terms peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, or peacebuilding, assume at a minimum the cessation of hostilities, and some 
will on the part of internal actors to forge a more peaceful and lasting political order. It would 
stretch the bounds of credulity to argue that Iraq has ever been at ‘peace’ since the U.S. 
invasion in 2003, as the civilian death rate did not fall below 10,000 per year until 2009, and 
only reached ‘lows’ of less than 4,200 per year in 2010 and 2011.57 As of June 2014, the death 
rate had increased to 7,819. Given current instability and violence, it is reasonable to expect 
that number to climb to for some time. 
 
 
                                                
57 “Documented civilian deaths from violence,” Database, Iraq Body Count, 
https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. 
Historical Overview of Reconstruction Planning 
 
Two widely voiced explanations for the failure of the invasion, occupation, and reconstruction 
of Iraq are hubris and incompetence. Both explanations hold that the Bush administration’s 
neoconservative ideologues, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning Douglas Feith, and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz exercised extensive control over the war planning process, 
and were ultimately especially unsuited to do so. These charges are particularly salient when 
examining the administration’s procedures for determining how many troops would be sent to 
Iraq, or the administration’s assumptions about allied states’ reactions after the fall of 
Saddam’s regime. However, as Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor note in 
their history of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, “Many critics have assailed the 
administration for lapses in its planning. But it is striking how much of the United States 
postwar strategy was the product of careful deliberation.”58 
 
The path of postconflict planning for postwar Iraq is tortuous and fractal, marred by a lack of 
bureaucratic coherence and a dearth of technical and regional expertise among key planners. 
Moreover, the process was hindered at every stage by critical intelligence failures, the 
assumption that success would result in eager assistance from allies, allocation of an 
insufficient number of troops, disjointed policy planning, and persistent misreading of 
historical analogy. This chapter will address each of these themes in turn, while providing an 
overview of the planning process for the reconstruction of postwar Iraq. 
Inte l l igence Fai lures  
 
In early 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency was ascendant. The CIA had not predicted the 
September attack on the World Trade Center one year prior, but in the aftermath of the 
invasion of Afghanistan the agency won back the administration’s confidence. The CIA’s 
contact with Afghanistan’s power players extended back to the 1970s and ‘80s, when it had 
closely supported the mujahideen in guerrilla operations against the Soviet military. Utilizing 
long established networks and contacts, the CIA’s role in the early years of the conflict in 
                                                
58 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II: 578. Their assessment is seconded by Rathmell, “Planning post-conflict 
reconstruction in Iraq,” 1017. 
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Afghanistan was widely seen as successful. As commander of the U.S. military’s Central 
Command, General Tommy R. Franks was impressed by the utility of Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) and CIA operatives in the early stages of the conflict in Afghanistan, and both he 
and Rumsfeld were confident SOF and the CIA could play a similar role in Iraq. Instead, 
following the Iraq invasion the Agency was once again in disgrace over critical intelligence 
failures. 
 
Much of the failure of U.S. intelligence came from Ahmed Chalabi, the leader of an Iraqi 
opposition group called the Iraqi National Congress (INC).59 Experts at State viewed him as 
opportunistic and untrustworthy, while the CIA saw him as an unscrupulous scoundrel, and 
subsequently had him blacklisted. No information he provided was supposed to be considered 
in intelligence assessments.60 However, Richard N. Perle, the neoconservative chairman of the 
Defense Policy Board and a close ally of Wolfowitz, viewed Chalabi’s presence as essential. 
Perle, along with Wolfowitz and Cheney, kept Chalabi involved in the planning process, even 
allowing him unescorted access through the Pentagon following the September attack.61 
Chalabi’s presence proved toxic to the planning process, raising false expectations of the ease 
with which Saddam’s regime would collapse, as well as the enthusiasm with which U.S. soldiers 
would be welcomed into Iraq. 
 
Other intelligence failures resulted from the lack of human intelligence in Iraq. The Agency 
relied overmuch on satellite and signals intelligence, causing it to miss critical information in 
the lead up to the invasion. Famously, the CIA confirmed with confidence that Saddam’s 
regime was probably in possession of WMD and large stockpiles of chemical and biological 
weapons, when in fact no such stockpiles existed. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War the 
CIA grew reliant on U.N. inspectors for reporting on Iraq’s WMD capabilities. When Saddam 
ejected the U.N. inspectors in 1998, the CIA no longer had access to U.N. intelligence, and no 
longer had spies or contacts within Iraq. CIA analysts turned to satellite surveillance, regime 
                                                
59 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 20; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 19-20; Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the 
Emerald City, 32-42; David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction of Iraq (New York: Basic Books, 
2005), 67-76. 
60 For an autobiographical account of Ahmed Chalabi’s relationship to the U.S. intelligence community see John 
Kiriakou, The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIA’s War on Terror (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009), 146-
157. 
61 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 21. 
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defectors, and extrapolation to produce their reports, resulting in increasing speculation and 
decreasing accuracy.62 
 
The CIA also failed to report the creation of Fedayeen safe houses in Iraqi towns, or the 
stockpiling of weapons and ammunition across the country.63 When the U.S. military entered 
Iraq, it considered the derelict Iraqi Republican Guard units the greatest threat, and proceeded 
to bypass large swaths of the country in the drive to Baghdad. Months in advance of the 
invasion, CIA operatives predicted that southern tribes would help seize key points of 
infrastructure along the invasion route, and suggested to Lieutenant General David McKiernan 
that small American flags be distributed in advance of the invasion.64 The agency wanted to 
capture the appreciation of grateful Iraqis on film and broadcast it throughout the region as a 
propaganda coup. McKiernan rejected the proposal, but CIA operatives remained optimistic. 
Assumption of  Assistance  
 
Part of the “hubris” explanation for the Iraq War lies in the foundations of the Bush 
administration’s “pre-emption” doctrine, which “held that while the United States might act 
unilaterally, the success of its military operation would attract allies to share the postwar 
burden.”65 In the lead up to the invasion, allies had yet to materialize, but the Bush 
administration felt that quickly toppling the regime would show how grateful the "liberated" 
Iraqis were, making other states willing (and even eager) to contribute to reconstruction. This 
premise pervaded the prewar planning process, and reinforced Rumsfeld’s parallel mission to 
produce results while expending less U.S. blood and treasure. 
 
By April 12, 2003 fighting had largely subsided in Baghdad. On April 15, President Bush 
called his advisors together to consider a plan for how allied forces would be deployed during 
Phase IV. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had optimistically titled their plan Iraq Phase IV: Gaining 
Coalition Commitment. The plan anticipated three foreign divisions: one led by the United 
Kingdom, one by Poland, and one joint “Muslim force” led by Saudi Arabia and other Persian 
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64 Phillips relates a similar overly optimistic anecdote in which Chalabi convinced the Pentagon that Iraqis would 
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Gulf States.66 The next day, Franks flew to Baghdad to inform the military that U.S. forces 
should prepare to begin withdraw from Iraq in sixty days.67 The president would soon 
announce the end of hostilities with his “Mission Accomplished” speech, a now infamous 
piece of political theatre staged aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, and Franks wanted the 
commanders prepared. “I wanted our troopers to work up their transportation plans, work up 
a process whereby they could begin redeployment in as little as sixty days,” Franks said. The 
idea was “to have the old man declare the end of major combat operation on the first of May 
because it opened the bank, so to speak, for us to go after additional international forces.”68 By 
showing allies how quickly the war had been won and convincing them that Iraq was stable, 
the administration could quickly swap combat troops for European constabularies and reduce 
the burden on U.S. forces. 
 
However, the manner in which the Bush administration pushed for the war alienated many 
states,69 and the dissolution of law and order in the aftermath of an invasion that proceeded 
with too few troops made allies even more reluctant to send their forces into harm's way. As 
the only significant military partner in the invasion and occupation of Iraq, British troops 
based their operations on previous experience in Northern Ireland and the Balkans.70 This 
ostensible advantage subsequently turned to “humiliation”, as British troops failed to combat 
Iran’s influence in Basra, and were subsequently withdrawn in 2008, after being the target of 
90% of attacks in Basra the previous year.71 The British contribution was largely a fig leaf 
designed to cover embarrassing U.S. unilateralism; as Alex Danchev has argued, British troops 
were “not exactly mercenaries. But the Hessian option was more nearly a reality in Iraq than in 
Vietnam.”72 Eventual contributions included the British in the south, an inconsistent Polish 
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division, and some Spanish troops hampered by strict rules of engagement. Ukraine 
contributed an additional brigade, but it was unable to defend itself and was forced to retreat.73 
Despite Rumsfeld’s dream of reforming the Pentagon by forcing it to fight a tighter, leaner, 
quicker war, the diplomatic results of “shock and awe” were not as anticipated. Instead, the 
troop numbers detailed by the Pentagon were barely sufficient to win the war, and entirely 
inadequate to secure the peace. 
Insuff ic ient Troops  
 
The debate over troop numbers related to generational changes within the U.S. military 
command. Generals such as Frederick M. Franks (no relation to CENTCOM Commander 
Tommy R. Franks) and Colin Powell had served at lower levels of the military during Vietnam, 
only to enter leadership roles during the age of Desert Storm and the conflicts in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Franks and Powell were both cautious of military engagement in absence of critical 
U.S. interests, and it was Franks who would advise General McKiernan to push for more 
troops in advance of the invasion.74 During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Powell was a key voice arguing for judicial use of American military force, often coming into 
conflict with more interventionist members of the Clinton administration. Much of Powell’s 
restraint came from his understanding of the Vietnam experience, in which civilian leaders had 
launched a military process without the requisite political commitment, leaving U.S. forces 
embroiled in a fight without sufficient resources or support.75 During Desert Storm and the 
crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, Powell insisted the civilian leadership articulate clear policy goals 
and plans in advance of military action.76 Powell retired from the Army in September 1993, 
just weeks before the Battle of Mogadishu, in which a group of U.S. Army Rangers and Special 
Operations Forces attacked targets in Somalia only to find themselves cut off and surrounded 
by militia men loyal to Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The clashes resulted in 18 U.S. military deaths 
and 80 wounded, along with between 1,500 and 3,000 Somali casualties, and it was precisely 
the sort of poorly planned and inadequately justified operation that Powell would have 
resisted.77 
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In contrast to Powell’s doctrine of overwhelming force, conservatives attempted to develop new 
military doctrines focusing on speed, mobility, and technological advancement. When 
Rumsfeld entered the Pentagon as Secretary of Defense he promised to oversee a revolution in 
military affairs, as articulated in George W. Bush’s speech at the Citadel in September 1999. 
Bush promised to review and overhaul the military, noting U.S. forces in the future “must be 
agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support.”78 The goal of 
creating a faster, more lethal, technologically advanced military shaped the debate about 
requisite troop levels for the Iraq invasion. Rumsfeld and his allies in the Bush administration 
continued to push the military to do more with less, and to do it faster than ever before.79 
 
General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM commander in advance of the invasion of Iraq, took 
different lessons from his prior military experience. Like Colin Powell and Frederick Franks, 
Tommy Franks had served in Vietnam, but unlike Powell he had not been involved with the 
conflict in the Balkans. Instead, Franks’s experience in Afghanistan convinced him of the 
effectiveness of small numbers of highly mobile forces, and he questioned the necessity of large 
numbers of military police and non-combat troops in postconflict situations.80 His view of 
Clinton-style nation building was less nuanced than Powell’s, and decidedly more negative. 
 
The literature assigns blame liberally for the administration’s failure to commit sufficient 
numbers of troops to the conflict. Washington Post reporter, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, considers 
Rumsfeld and Cheney ultimately responsible for the troop level miscalculation, with Feith 
playing a supporting role in the collective delusion. In their military-centric account, Gordon 
and Trainor place much of the blame on Rumsfeld, painting a narrative in which he simply 
bulldozed resistance to his policies. Phillips finds National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
culpable for the disaster, arguing she cared more for preserving her relationship with the 
president than about securing the best policy, and that her actions helped sideline Colin 
Powell.81 Gordon and Trainor criticize Rice and Powell as well, noting the former’s 
ineffectiveness at managing bureaucratic infighting, and criticizing the latter for his reticence. 
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Gordon and Trainor insist, “the nation would have been better served if Powell had objected 
when the secretary of defense moved to seize control of postwar planning.”82 
 
Overlooked in both narratives is Franks, commander of CENTCOM and intimately involved 
with the planning process. Franks had worked closely with General Anthony Zinni in 1998, 
when the latter drew up the first plans for a post-Saddam Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War. 
Zinni’s plan, OPLAN 1003-98, called for over 400,000 troops, more than twice the number 
eventually allocated to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Zinni later noted, “If I had to point to one 
person who was deeply involved in 1003-98 it was Tommy Franks. He was the major 
contributor to the force levels and the planning and everything else. He was more involved in 
it than just about anybody else. That was his life. He and his planning staff seemed to be 
committed to the plan.”83 Despite this prior experience, Franks consented to draw up three 
new plans in the face of Rumsfeld’s efforts to decrease the troop commitment. Generated Start 
would begin with 145,000 troops in theatre, and build to a total of 250,000 troops as 
reinforcements arrived over the course of the war.84 Running Start would build to a similar 
level after beginning with only 18,000 troops.85 In August 2002, under continual pressure from 
Rumsfeld, Franks drew up a Hybrid plan, sometimes referred to as the 5-11-16-125 Plan, which 
would begin hostilities with 20,000 troops and increase to approximately 200,000.86 
 
Somehow, between November 2001 and December 2002 Franks reversed his opinion. Franks 
insisted he concurred fully with the Rumsfeld’s ultimate decision, but Secretary of the Army 
Tom White argued Rumsfeld had eventually beaten Franks into submission. “Rumsfeld just 
ground Franks down,” White explained, “If you grind away at the military guys long enough, 
they will finally say, ‘Screw it, I’ll do the best I can with what I have.’ The nature of Rumsfeld is 
that you just get tired of arguing with him.”87 Franks’s reversal was not as high profile as 
Powell’s reticence or Rice’s mismanagement of the national security apparatus, but it was of 
crucial importance to the planning process. Officers lower in the chain of command voiced 
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concerns about sufficient troop levels late into the planning stages, but they were reluctant to 
force the issue. As Lieutenant Colonel Steven W. Peterson later explained: 
 
No officer in the headquarters was prepared to argue for actions that would siphon 
resources from the war fighting effort, when the fighting had not yet begun. To do so, 
would have been contrary to a career of schooling that makes fighting the determining 
activity of war. No matter how often post-war issues were raised, they never took on an 
equivalent importance to war fighting considerations in the eyes of the planners or 
commanders. Who could blame them? The business of the military is war and war is 
fighting. The war was not yet started, let alone finished, when these issues were being 
raised. Only a fool would propose hurting the war fighting effort to address post-war 
conditions that might or might not occur.88 
Fractal  Planning  
 
Planning for the post-conflict stage, or Phase IV, of the Iraq invasion did not begin in earnest 
until well after initial planning for the invasion itself. Pentagon plans for a post-Saddam Iraq 
existed as early as 1998, and it was from these contingencies that Tommy Franks drew up his 
initial proposals for Rumsfeld.89 Franks began his planning in late November 2001, but as late 
as August 2002 he considered the Phase IV plans to be the responsibility of Colin Powell’s 
State Department,90 while Powell himself argued he had not heard enough about post-invasion 
plans.91 Following a classified war game held in December 2002, then Lieutenant General John 
Abizaid, Franks’s deputy, and Senator Joseph Biden raised concerns about the absence of post 
conflict planning.92 
 
By early October 2002 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had drafted a rough Phase IV plan calling 
for a military headquarters staffed by technical and regional experts from across the U.S. 
government. The headquarters would collaborate closely with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 
and eventually be supplanted by an interim civilian administration. As CENTCOM would still 
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be embroiled in Afghanistan following the war, the JCS hoped to shift responsibility for 
postwar Iraq to a new chain of command. They were overruled; during Rumsfeld’s review of 
the JCS plan he eliminated all references to the State Department, placed Defense in the lead, 
and ensured the new headquarters would report to his office via CENTCOM and Franks.93 
Rumsfeld’s plan was approved by Rice and President Bush, granting Defense primary 
responsibility for reconstruction of an occupied state for the first time since World War II. 
With State eliminated from the equation and other agencies sidelined, Defense was given a 
huge responsibility, without the benefit of experience from State planners who had operated in 
the Balkans and Afghanistan. 
 
With Rumsfeld’s plan approved, Phase IV planning stalled until December, when Dick 
Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, became anxious about the impending war. The JCS 
chief planner Lieutenant General George Casey appointed Brigadier General Steve Hawkins to 
head a new joint task force, JTF-4, and instructed him to begin organizing the Combined Joint 
Task Force-Iraq (CJTF-I), which would form the military headquarters called for by Rumsfeld’s 
plan. Hawkins, commander of the Ohio’s division of the Army Corps of Engineers, had no 
experience with Iraq or the Middle East, but he and Casey had served together in Bosnia.94 
With no budget and only a cobbled together staff, Hawkins shipped from Virginia to 
CENTCOM’s headquarters in Tampa, before eventually landing in Doha at General 
McKiernan’s Third Army headquarters. Once there, Hawkins was subordinated to 
McKiernan’s planning staff, where Major General Albert Whitley and Kevin Benson had 
begun to flesh out the Phase IV plan Eclipse II, named after the plan for reconstructing 
Germany in the wake of World War II.95 
 
It soon became clear that deep contradictions existed in the plan’s objectives. The plan 
assumed Iraq’s institutions would survive the invasion, and that other states and U.S. 
government agencies would provide funds and staff to undertake reconstruction.96 Moreover, 
as Peterson noted later, many of the objectives required to prosecute the war ran directly 
counter to long-term objectives of securing the peace. Peterson notes, “Over a month before 
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the war began, the Phase IV planning group concluded that the campaign would produce 
conditions at odds with meeting strategic objectives.”97 Infrastructure and communication 
mechanisms central to the regime’s command and control ability were slated for destruction, 
but those same mechanisms would prove crucial to stability and reconstruction in the 
aftermath of regime collapse. Planners drafted contingencies that allotted more resources and 
manpower to confront infiltration by foreign fighters, looting, and criminal activity among 
other concerns, but the military command was already fighting to claw more men and supplies 
from the Pentagon hierarchy. Peterson’s superiors (Major General James “Spider” Marks and 
Lieutenant General David McKiernan) vetoed the proposed modifications.98 
 
On January 20, 2003 the Bush Administration passed National Security Presidential Directive 
24, formally acknowledging what was already true, Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense would 
be running the postwar show in Iraq.99 Rumsfeld’s aide, Douglas Feith, had already brought in 
retired general Jay Garner to begin organizing the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA), the civilian arm of McKiernan’s Phase IV plan. Tasked with providing 
emergency assistance, establishing public services, and reconstituting the Iraqi military, Garner 
and his team organized in the Pentagon, but only deployed to the Persian Gulf in early 
March.100 Brought into the game in the final innings, Garner did not hear of the Department 
of State’s Future of Iraq Project until the February 20 during a predeployment drill at the 
National Defense University in Washington.101 Thomas Warrick, an international lawyer and 
human rights expert, had been working on the Future of Iraq Project (FOI) for more than a 
year, and Garner quickly added him to ORHA’s team. One week later Rumsfeld demanded 
that Garner fire Warrick; Vice President Cheney’s office wanted a place for Chalabi in post-war 
Iraq, and Warrick (like most from State) regarded Chalabi with suspicion.102 With key State 
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department staff barred by Rumsfeld from participating in ORHA’s efforts, Garner never saw 
the FOI reports, or any of the other previous planning done by government officials. 
Ultimately Garner managed reconstruction policy for less than a month before being replaced 
by L. Paul Bremer and the newly instituted Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) on May 11, 
2003. 
The Fate of State’s Pre-War Planning 
 
By involving a large number of exiles in prewar planning efforts for a postwar peace, the U.S. 
Department of State reprised a role played in the 1940s.103 In the prior performance, State 
dominated the planning efforts,104 but in the case of Iraq is unclear the information gathered 
by State officials had much impact outside their own department. Chandrasekaran terms the 
FOI reports “Washington’s best attempt to prepare for the post-Saddam era”, but his account 
of the post-war situation in Iraq details bureaucratic infighting between the White House and 
the Departments of Defense and State, and concludes the FOI reports were never passed to 
post-conflict planners in the Pentagon, ORHA, or the CPA.105 Gordon and Trainor argue the 
FOI reports were “of uneven quality” and “far short of a viable plan”.106 Their interviews with 
members of Jay Garner’s senior staff, including the CIA’s David Kay and U.S. Army colonel 
Paul Hughes, are revealing.107 Kay termed the study “unimplementable”, arguing, “It was a 
series of essays to describe what the future could be. It was not a plan to hand to a task force 
and say ‘go implement.’ If it had been carried out it would not have made a difference.”108 
Hughes said of the FOI project, “While it produced some useful background information it 
had no chance of really influencing the post-Saddam phase of the war.”109 
 
David L. Phillips, a former Department of State contractor who was closely involved with the 
FOI Democratic Principles planning group has defended the project, asserting: 
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The Future of Iraq Project was no silver bullet for Iraq’s problems. To be sure, its 
reports were not definitive blueprints. Pentagon officials thought the endeavor was too 
theoretical and academic. But their outright dismissal—and even undermining—of the 
project was a serious mistake. No formal directive was issued terminating the Future of 
Iraq Project; it just ceased to function after the White House assigned postwar 
responsibility to the OSD in January 2003.110 
 
Following my review of the FOI project reports, Gordon and Trainor’s assessment of the 
project’s potential is most accurate. However, as will be discussed below, the FOI reports do 
articulate several policy suggestions ultimately contravened to disastrous effect by Bremer’s 
CPA or Rumsfeld’s Pentagon. Some study of the State Department’s work could only have 
been beneficial. 
 
Despite Chandrasekaran’s statement that Jay Garner and ORHA were never able to consult 
State’s FOI project, subsequent reporting indicates the project reached U.S. officials in Iraq in 
some capacity. In a post-invasion article reviewing the prescient predictions of the FOI project, 
The New York Times reports optimistically, “Many of the Iraqi ministers are graduates of the 
working groups, and have brought that experience with them,” further noting that newly 
arrived CPA staffers received CD-ROM versions of the 13-volume study. The article closes with 
a quote from an unnamed senior official stationed in Baghdad, “It’s our bible coming out 
here.”111 This squares with Hughes’ assertion that the study was conveyed to U.S. 
administrators in Iraq, though how closely it was studied remains unclear. Phillips asserts that 
the Bush administration eventually adopted many of the proposals first articulated by the FOI 
Project, but admits the policy corrections came too late; “by then, the well was poisoned. What 
would have been hard had been made even harder.”112 
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Planning and World War II Mythologies  
 
As would become clear later, State and Defense were drawing from a decidedly different 
repertoire of historical analogy in their efforts to make sense of post-war Iraq. State looked to 
prior experience in the Balkans, East Timor, and most recently Afghanistan, whereas Defense’s 
most recent involvement in reconstruction dated to the aftermath of World War II and the 
reconstruction of West Germany and Japan. Many in the Department of Defense saw little in 
the case of the Balkans or Afghanistan that was worthy of emulation, and inappropriate 
parallels to the World War II cases marred much of the Department’s planning activities. 
 
These analogies were not unique to the Bush administration.113 In December 1998, the 
Clinton administration gave the go ahead for Operation Desert Fox, a military exercise 
carrying the appellation of World War II German general, Erwin Rommel. The Desert Fox 
appellation parallels later U.S. rhetoric comparing Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler, and the 
scope and consequences of that rhetorical analogy have been discussed at length elsewhere.114 
Lieutenant General Gregory S. Newbold recalled the tension in the Pentagon in the days 
following the events of September 11, 2001, “We truly thought another attack might be 
imminent and that Al Qaeda was the cause of this Pearl Harbour-style attack.”115 Newbold’s 
phrasing illustrates the comparisons already being draw in Washington between the new 
“global war on terror” and the type of existential fight the United States had faced during 
World War II. 
 
Department of Defense planning for the invasion and occupation of Iraq drew philosophically 
and practically from the World War II experience. Operation Cobra was the July 1944 drive 
from Normandy to liberate France. Conducted by General Omar Bradley’s First Army, and 
joined by General George Patton’s Third Army, the plan called for a quick break through the 
German defences and a race for the Seine River. In March 2003, McKiernan and his senior 
planners designed a fast attack plan to cross the deserts of Iraq and capture Baghdad. They 
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named their plan Cobra II.116 McKiernan’s Phase IV plan, produced with the help of Major 
General Albert Whitley and Kevin Benson, was called Eclipse II, named after the plan for 
reconstructing Germany in the wake of World War II.117 McKiernan’s plans strove to replicate 
the historical success of the attack into Germany, but instead built upon a mass of erroneous 
assumptions. Iraq’s society did not maintain cohesion in the post-war period as Germany’s 
had, nor was Iraq’s infrastructure (already floundering after decades of war and sanctions) so 
easily rebuilt. 
 
Perle noted in the lead up to the invasion that U.S. plans for post-war Iraq were not without 
historical precedent. Predicting a warm welcome for U.S. troops, Perle anticipated quick 
construction of a new regime. With respect to Iraq’s former army, secret police, and 
intelligence services, he advocated “a process akin to de-Nazification after World War II, in 
which we will attempt to identify and root out people who cannot be allowed to remain in 
authority.”118 Throughout the planning process Feith conducted postwar planning with utmost 
secrecy. When Garner was brought in to launch ORHA he was told no plans existed and to 
start from scratch. Not until ten days after he arrived in Baghdad did Garner realize that 
Feith’s office had drawn up extensive plans for de-Ba’athification, reconstruction of Iraq’s 
Army, and the installation of Chalabi at the head of Iraq’s transitional government.119 Feith’s 
concept for de-Ba’athification was connected principally to Allied de-Nazification policies in 
World War II. As will be discussed in later chapters, the flawed historical mythologies 
underpinning U.S. policy were directly responsible for policy failures in Iraq. 
The Past as Prologue  
 
In his post-mortem of the Phase IV planning process, Peterson argues the failure of post-war 
policy in Iraq “was not so much one of omission, as it was of ineffectiveness.”120 He concludes, 
“our fundamental theories are all, in reality, theories of warfare, not war. This causes us to give 
primacy to war fighting considerations in planning and lose sight of the fact that a war is not 
necessarily won by brilliant military operations.”121 Military operations suffered from 
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intelligence failures, optimistic assumptions, insufficient resources, disjointed policy planning, 
and persistent misreading of historical analogy. The reconstruction operations that followed 
were crippled from birth. Subordinated to the warfare planning, postconflict preparations 
suffered additionally from minimal staff continuity from one stage to the next; the wheel was 
constantly being reinvented, and there was almost no exchange of information between—or 
even within--departments.122 
 
Even if the planning process had been handled differently, the U.S. ultimately invaded with 
too few troops, forcing the invasion to proceed in a rushed and incomplete fashion. The U.S. 
military advanced toward Baghdad leaving fighters behind it who later became insurgents. 
There were too few troops to be spared to secure buildings, infrastructure, prisoners, or 
weapons caches. Insufficient troop levels placed coalition forces in danger, requiring extensive 
usage of air power and emergency air attacks into cities, which resulted in more civilian deaths 
and destroyed more of Iraq’s already fragile infrastructure—infrastructure that would later have 
to be rebuilt while fighting a growing insurgency. Given how poor the administration’s plans 
were, it is not clear more forces would have enabled success. But given insufficient troop levels, 
the quality of its plans mattered little. 
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Political Reconstruction 
 
Four issues occupied U.S. officials in their prewar planning for Iraq’s political reconstruction: 
(1) the type of interim administration that would govern Iraq in advance of a more permanent 
democratic regime; (2) the role of Iraq’s exiles; (3) disputes over federal models for the new 
administration; and (4) the timeline and steps required for the development of Iraq’s new 
constitution and the administration of democratic elections. This chapter will discuss the four 
elements in succession, although all are naturally intertwined and self-constitutive. It is 
important to avoid undue reliance on arguments of path-dependency, but it is equally naïve to 
imagine that each decision made within the U.S. context was devoid of future repercussions. 
 
The American policy of pursuing political change in Iraq through regime change was not—as is 
often maintained—an idiosyncratic product of George W. Bush’s presidency.123 In May 1991, 
shortly after the conclusion of the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush ordered the CIA to 
“create the conditions for removal of Saddam Hussein from power.”124 Bush’s signing of the 
covert “lethal finding” allotted $100 million to the effort, and effectively instituted a U.S. 
policy of regime change. In October 1998, the Clinton administration formalized the policy, 
signing into law H.R. 4655, or the “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998”, which stated: 
 
It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime 
headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a 
democratic government to replace that regime.125 
 
Clinton’s signing statement elaborated U.S. aims, including the desire for “a democratically 
supported regime”, and a “pluralistic, participatory political system.”126 Noting that such a 
system “will not happen under the current Iraq leadership”, Clinton pledged to utilize funding 
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from the recently passed Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which granted the 
United States authority to provide support to “Iraqi democratic opposition organizations” 
before, during, and after Iraq’s transition to democracy. In the Iraq Liberation Act itself, 
Congress articulated several criteria for appropriate organizations, mandating that: 
 
the President shall consider only organizations that: 
(1) include a broad spectrum of Iraqi individuals, groups, or both, opposed to the 
Saddam Hussein regime; and 
(2) are committed to democratic values, to respect for human rights, to peaceful 
relations with Iraq’s neighbors, to maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and to 
fostering cooperation among democratic opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime.127 
 
The act of Congress mandated the policy of regime change, but the question of which elements 
of the Iraqi opposition would gain U.S. support remained unanswered. This gap in policy 
articulation proved divisive. As government agencies moved forward in the planning process, 
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
developed strikingly different views on the role of Iraqi exiles in a post-Saddam Iraq. 
Inter im Administration: “Who wil l  govern Iraq?”  
 
In January 2001 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell queried State’s Bureau of Near Eastern 
Affairs on the origins of U.S. regime-change policy in Iraq. On January 23 he received a 
response, pointing to the Iraq Liberation Act and subsequent statements by President Clinton 
and senior members of the Department of State.128 The memo was circumspect on the U.S. 
role in promoting regime change in Iraq, noting “we expect the Iraqi people themselves to be 
the source of regime change.”129 This position soon changed. As elements of the U.S. 
government moved forward with the prewar reconstruction of Iraq, several proposals emerged 
about the form of administration that should govern Iraq in the immediate aftermath of 
regime change. Government agencies utilized different historical analogies to support their 
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arguments, with the Department of Defense looking to postwar France, while the Department 
of State and the Central Intelligence Agency focused on postwar Germany and Japan. U.S. 
proposals were marred by unsound historical analogies, but errors were not limited to the 
federal bureaucracy or the Bush Administration. Rather, these historical analogies were echoed 
in the concurrent policy discourse produced by academics in Washington think tanks. 
The Rodman Memo 
 
The first evidence of prewar planning for the political reconstruction of Iraq is a May 2002 
memo from Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter W. Rodman to Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld. Entitled “Support for Iraqi Opposition”, the memo articulated the type of interim 
administration that should oversee post-war Iraq. Rodman dismissed an international 
commission as inadequate, instead arguing the Iraqi opposition should have a role in regime 
change in order promote regional legitimacy, and as a way of “making sure the wrong people 
don’t fill the vacuum”.130 Rodman referenced the historical precedent of postwar France, 
noting the Allies initially planned a military government for France, but reconsidered when 
Charles de Gaulle “was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen.” Rodman cautioned, “had 
FDR and Churchill stuck to their plan, the Communists would have been the only significant 
political force in the country.”131 Rodman argued Iraq’s domestic opposition similarly 
contained many “undesirable” elements, among them communists, Sunni fundamentalists, 
and radical Shia. Only by pre-empting those groups with a U.S. supported opposition could 
the U.S. “avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.” 
 
Rodman’s memo was welcomed by Rumsfeld, and upon the Secretary’s request a reworked 
version was delivered on July 1, 2002 to senior National Security Council members, including 
Cheney, Powell, Rice, and CIA Director George Tenet. The memo sparked action within other 
government agencies, and subsequent reports by the Department of State and the CIA 
specifically addressed the proposals laid out in Rodman’s memo, namely, what sort of 
institution would govern Iraq after a U.S. invasion, and what the role of Iraq’s exiled 
opposition would be. 
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Prevarication at State; CIA Caution 
 
Early on, the State Department declined to take a position on the type of interim 
administration that would oversee postwar Iraq. In October 2001, the Department launched 
its Future of Iraq project (FOI), bringing Iraqi exiles together with international experts in a 
series of working groups to begin planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. On July 8, 2002, shortly 
after Rodman’s memo was delivered to senior NSC officials, an internal State Department 
cable describing the FOI project went from Secretary Powell’s office to key embassy posts. The 
cable stressed the FOI working groups were “not an attempt to select an Iraqi government in 
exile,” but rather to engage “free Iraqis” in initial planning stages for post-Saddam Iraq (here, 
the term “free Iraqis” perhaps unwittingly echoes the idea of De Gaulle’s Free French).132 For 
the State Department, the role of exiles was one of “preliminary planning” and priority setting, 
with the possible side-benefit of uniting Iraqi exiles through a process of practical engagement. 
Beyond reiterating U.S. support for a broad-based, “democratic, representative government”, 
the cable made no further mention of the shape a future government of Iraq would take.133 
Indeed, it emphasized the working group was, “not to write a new constitution for Iraq—that 
will have to be done after regime change when all Iraqis can have a voice.”134 However, the 
committee charged with discussing political questions of transition, the Democratic Principles 
and Procedures Working group, did not meet until the fall of 2002. By that point, initiatives 
originating from the Department of Defense superseded State’s deliberations. 
 
As State pushed forward with the FOI working groups, the Central Intelligence Agency 
produced its own report in response to Rodman’s memo. The August 7 CIA report analysed 
the postwar occupations of West Germany and Japan in an effort to outline policy proposals 
for Iraq. The Agency’s analysis was decidedly cautious, arguing that although “In both 
Germany and Japan, the US occupation started with sweeping goals for political, social, and 
economic change” such aspirations were “rapidly scaled back”. 135 The CIA pointed to postwar 
Germany and Japan for examples of ‘indirect administration’, and noted that the United States 
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relied heavily on existing local authorities in both cases.136 Highlighting the benefits of 
retaining elements of the civilian bureaucracy, the report recommended “a rapid transfer of 
power to local and governate level authorities”, but cautioned this might encourage corruption, 
or require leaving some members of the ancien régime in place.137 
Rodman’s Response: Leveraging the Opposition 
 
While the Future of Iraq Project crawled along over at Foggy Bottom, Feith’s Office of Policy 
Planning in the Pentagon powered ahead with its plans for a transitional government headed 
by members of Iraq’s exiled opposition. In an internal memo delivered to Secretary Rumsfeld 
on August 15, 2002, Rodman struck back against the proposals from State and the CIA. While 
the State report has yet to be released to the public, from Rodman’s memo we know State 
proposed a “Transitional Civil Authority” to govern post-Saddam Iraq under the supervision of 
the Untied States. State was concerned Iraq’s exiles were too divided to adequately govern the 
country, and that U.S. interests were better served by more direct administrative control.138 
 
In response to CIA arguments that only a robust U.S. administration could hope to fill the 
power vacuum in a post-Saddam Iraq, Rodman argued that without the Iraqi opposition, U.S. 
efforts would lack domestic and regional legitimacy. In an apparent paradox, Rodman drew 
parallels with Afghanistan’s Bonn process, and argued that although Iraq’s opposition was less 
capable than the Afghan equivalent of forming a provisional government, it would be essential 
for unifying Iraq’s moderate political elements, and for preventing “bad guys” from filling the 
space left by Saddam.139 Rodman proposed the United States use its “considerable leverage” to 
“accelerate the process of unifying the opposition” (emphasis original).140 
 
Rodman’s memos exhibit a puerile understanding of de Gaulle, France, and the postwar 
planning process. Roosevelt and de Gaulle’s relationship was characterized by suspicion and 
mutual dislike,141 not the geniality with which the Pentagon received Chalabi. Rodman’s memo 
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also overlooked the stark differences between the military capabilities of the Free French, and 
the unarmed and unorganized state of Iraq’s exiles. Rodman overlooked the importance of 
regime legitimacy, most notably that exiles entirely empowered by an external actor would 
likely lose domestic and regional credibility by virtue of their cooperation with U.S. forces. 
This concern arose in Washington policy circles that fall, as when former Pentagon official 
turned National Defense University employee, Alina Romanowski, participated in a three-day 
expert panel at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.142 In an articulation steeped in 
Millian logic, Romanowski cautioned, “We must face the possibility that whatever government 
we foster or impose may be considered illegitimate from the start and may survive only as long 
as we are prepared to exercise the force necessary to suppress opposition.”143 
Mission Creep At State: In Search of the Technocrats 
 
During the autumn of 2002, the Department of State’s Future of Iraq planning grew beyond 
the initial parameters outlined in the July cable. From State Department briefings prepared on 
November 1, 2002 and May 12, 2003, we know that two working groups were established to 
discuss issues of governance and political reform, one called “Democratic Principles” and the 
other “Local Government”.144 Subsequent reports from the proceedings of the meeting group 
appear in the final reports from both committees. State’s plans for an interim administration 
slowly gathered detail, and the Democratic Principles and Procedures report proposed a more 
technocratic vision of the Transitional Authority, aiming for “professionalism and individual 
capability” rather than “political or sectarian and confessional representation”.145 
 
Although later reports maintain the Department of State opposed the increasing influence of 
Ahmad Chalabi and the INC,146 parts of the FOI reports shed light on how the INC came to 
have such a powerful role within governmental organizations planning the pre-war 
reconstruction of Iraq. Phillips claims “The INC envisioned the Democratic Principles 
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Working Group as a vehicle to formalize plans for a government-in-exile with Chalabi at its 
head,” and Chalabi worked hard to place INC supporters in key positions within the working 
group.147 Although State Department officials opposed INC dominance, the Democratic 
Principles and Procedures working group based its discussion on the INC’s Salahuddin 
Principles, and proposed that: 
 
the nucleus of the Transitional Authority should be constituted from this Iraqi 
opposition outside Iraq, through a mechanism of broad participation and 
representation and a structure that is capable of expansion within Iraq.148 
 
As the influence of Chalabi and the INC spread, it grew increasingly difficult for State to shape 
the agenda of the FOI working groups, while proposals from the Pentagon began to control the 
internal discourse of the Bush Administration as well. 
Federal i sm 
 
As visions of a post-Saddam Iraq began to gather steam, the question of whether to establish a 
centralized or devolved government emerged. The CIA report recommended a federal 
solution. Pointing to the German experience, the Agency argued “The success of the Federal 
Republic and the US occupation of Germany was due at least in part to confronting a set of 
issues that had undermined previous German regimes”, namely “regional particularism, ethnic 
strife, and a lack of a clear identity”.149 The report argued that U.S. efforts to rebalance a strong 
federal system of government were key to the success of postwar reconstruction efforts, and 
suggested, “The German model of strong, US backed federal structure…could provide a useful 
model for Iraq”.150 State’s FOI Project made similar recommendations. Iraqi working group 
participants said the United States should commit to Iraq the same way it had committed to 
West Germany and Japan after World War II, but a briefing notes the “military government 
idea did not go down well.”151 
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The Department of State’s position was more restrained. The Democratic Principles group met 
first in September, and again in October 2002. Contrary to the limitations placed on the 
group’s deliberations by the earlier July cable, the working group began detailed discussions of 
“political transition to an Iraq based on democracy and federalism” utilizing principles 
articulated by Chalabi’s INC.152 The proposal of a federal model appears to have come at the 
instigation of Iraqi working group participants rather than U.S. policy makers. Phillips explains 
that Iraqi exiles and Kurds favoured a federal model for a reconstructed Iraq. “Iraq’s problems 
always arose because of abuses by the central government”, Phillips notes, “therefore, 
decentralizing authority was the best way to harmonize competing claims between Iraq’s 
factions.”153 
 
State’s report ultimately accepted federalism as a way forward, but cautioned against 
redistricting or discussion of federal demarcations during the transitional period, as such 
discussion would be divisive and suffer from a lack of popular legitimacy. The report notes: 
 
due to the issue of federalism, redistricting Iraq during the interim or transitional 
period would by its very nature be difficult; in addition, as federalism is—to an extent—a 
highly debated issue (that is, a politically charged one), attempting to change Iraqi 
administrative divisions along particular lines (ethnic or administrative) during the 
transitional period would be destabilizing and would, due to the lack of a popular 
referendum on the matter, be illegitimate (or at least imposed).154 
 
The challenges encountered in the State Department FOI working group were echoed in think 
tank reports from the same period. In early 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
argued against an understanding of federalism based on “ethnic enclaves”, instead urging 
policy planners “to encourage territorial/provincial lines within a unified, federal framework.” 
Academic scholars put forward similar arguments. Writing in advance of the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, Professor Charles Tripp articulated the dangers of seeing federalism as an inherent 
solution to the political challenges facing a post-Saddam Iraq. His analysis is worth quoting at 
length: 
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The vexed question of federalism in a future Iraq…has been proposed as a ‘solution’ to 
the social fragmentation of Iraq on the one hand and to the tendency to central 
dictatorship on the other. Yet in the territorial divisions most usually suggested – 
Kurdish northeast, Sunni Arab northwest and Shia south – crude divisions of the 
population have been imposed which fail to capture the complexity of what it means to 
be Sunni, Shia or Arab in Iraq. Only in the Kurdish region does this proposal meet 
with general approval and correspond to a certain historical and political reality. The 
demographics and allegiances of the other regions of Iraq are considerably less receptive 
to such a proposal. For some, it indicates a divisive attempt to reduce still further the 
terrain of national politics; for others, it suggests that only those associated with a 
certain kind of exclusivist identity politics, whether defined in sectarian or tribal terms, 
will be recognised as legitimate political players, creating considerable fear and anxiety 
among those who are excluded by reason of social origins or ideological choice.155 
 
As Tripp warned, further discussion of federalism within the FOI working group proved 
divisive. While Iraq’s exiles agreed in principal that Saddam Hussein-era centralization of the 
Iraqi state was negative, proposals for a remedy were often contradictory. While Kurdish exiles 
maintained a federal system was the only safeguard for the rights of Iraq’s Kurds, the Assyrian 
and Turkmen populations favoured some centralization of power, lest they find themselves a 
minority within a largely independent Kurdish federated zone. Other Iraqi nationalists worried 
about the economic viability of an Iraqi state if oil-rich regions in the north and the south were 
allowed to spin off into fiscal independence.156 Mired in mistrust, the working group failed to 
achieve agreement. 
Constitutional Chickens or Electoral  Eggs  
 
As planning progressed two questions arose: how to draft and adopt a new constitution; and 
second, how and when to hold democratic elections. Two differing points of view emerged 
from within the American elite. One advocated a bottom-up approach, begun initially with 
local level elections and indirect occupation rule, and expanding to national elections for a 
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new central government. This view is best articulated in the reports of State’s FOI working 
groups. The second view advocated a top-down approach, achieving democratization through 
national elections held as early as possible. It is best represented by reports from Defense and 
the CIA. 
From the Bottom, Up 
 
The Department of State reports contain the first articulation of a proposed timeline for the 
promulgation of a new constitution and democratic elections in Iraq. Based on the 
tendentious assumption that Iraq was capable of conducting elections within 18 months, the 
working group recommended the Transitional Authority “set a time limit on its mandate of a 
period not less than 24 months and not more than 36 months.”157 In support of a bottom up 
path to democratization, the Local Governance working group recommended local elections be 
held within the first six to nine months, and not more than twelve months following regime 
change.158 Participants anticipated that local elections “will set the process for grassroots 
democracy that will provide administrative training for local officials and to the bureaucracy to 
run future national elections.”159 
 
Despite prior assertions that the FOI working groups were not to select a new government of 
Iraq or to draw up a new constitution, the Democratic Principles Working Group report laid 
out detailed recommendations for key constitutional provisions. The report called for a two-
phased establishment of a Transitional Authority, to be selected at a conference of Iraqi exiles 
and then to adopt the “basic laws” laid out later in the working group report. The report 
cautions: 
 
Due to the fact that Iraqis may be sensitive to the term “interim constitution” as a 
result of its abuses since 1958, one proposal would be to label this interim constitution 
as the “Basic Laws of Iraq”, rather than refer to the term constitution in the title.160 
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Washington think tanks also supported a staged, bottom-up approach to democratization in 
Iraq. The joint 2003 report from CFR and the James Baker Institute tracks closely to State’s 
proposals. The report recommends a three stage political transformation, wherein a U.S.- or 
coalition-led interim administration works with Iraqi technical advisors to “establish Iraqi 
advisory committees throughout Baghdad and [the] provinces”.161 This technical 
administration would give way to a “U.N. supervised Iraqi interim administration” within two 
years. The interim administration, in turn, would organize the local and parliamentary 
elections that would lead to a sovereign Iraqi government.162 CSIS’s report from the same 
period makes similar arguments, proposing that Iraq’s constitution and legal codes were 
workable for the initial 18-month period of interim government.163 During this period, CSIS 
analysts proposed developing a “national dialogue process” under U.N. auspices, which would 
“involve a graduated selection of delegates from throughout Iraq and the diaspora, starting at 
the grassroots level in all of Iraq’s 18 provinces”.164 This group would develop agendas and 
timetables for the transfer of sovereignty and the dissolution of the interim administration, and 
work to organize elections, revise and draft a new constitution, and establish a truth and 
reconciliation process, among other goals. 
From the Top, Down 
 
Department of Defense made no explicit reference to constitutional proposals or a timeline for 
elections, but proposals from within Feith’s Office of Policy Planning played a key role in the 
initial operations of Bremer’s CPA. The August CIA report makes no overt recommendation 
on the subject of constitutional promulgation or electoral policy. However, its references to 
postwar reconstruction in West Germany and Japan imply that strict U.S. control of political 
reconstruction should be expected. The report notes that in West Germany, the U.S. 
occupation authorities “did impose controls on the political process” by rejecting socialist 
constitutional provisions and selecting politicians for particular administrative positions. In the 
case of Japan, the report highlights the U.S. role in maintaining an extensive censorship system 
to oversee Japan’s public sphere, and explains, “occupation authorities took full control of 
                                                
161 Edward P. Djerejian et al., “Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq,” Council on Foreign 
Relations and James A. Baker III Institute, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002): 28. 
162 Djerejian et al., “Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq,” 27-28. 
163 Frederick D. Barton and Bathsheba N. Crocker, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Relations, 
January 2003), www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/csis-wiserpeace-012103.pdf, 9-10. 
164 Barton and Crocker, “A Wiser Peace,” 20. 
  47 
writing a new constitution after Japanese officials produced a draft that offered few changes to 
Japan’s prewar political structure.”165 These anecdotes lent support to the idea of a broad U.S. 
role in Iraq’s political reconstruction, and encouraged extensive U.S. involvement in the 
constitutional drafting process. 
 
Some Washington think tanks adopted positions similar to proposals from Defense and the 
CIA. In late 2002, a report from senior Brookings Institution analysts appeared in the 
academic journal Survival. Most of the article addressed diplomatic and military aspects of the 
regime change policy, but the final three pages briefly discussed postwar planning. In parallel 
with top-down democratization advanced by the Pentagon, Brookings analysts made a case for 
U.S. sponsorship of the interim administration, and even suggested exiled Iraqis prepare a new 
constitution in advance of the invasion: 
 
[The United States] should articulate a clear vision of a unified democratic Iraq that 
will ensure fair representation for all ethnic and religious groups; autonomy for the 
Iraqi Kurds; respect for the rule of law and protection of civil rights, including women’s 
rights. The US should also now encourage Iraqis in exile to draw up a new 
constitution. And it should train a cadre of Iraqi professionals who can work with the 
US army to lay the groundwork for a functioning interim administration.166 
 
Other voices were more cautious. At the October conference at the Washington Institute, 
Alina Romanowski called attention to the historical examples of West Germany and Japan, 
calling them “the most demanding U.S. military occupations” in history. Despite caution about 
the effect of U.S. collaboration on the perceived legitimacy of Iraq’s exiles, she concluded that 
success following World War II had resulted from the U.S.’s dominant role in reconstruction. 
Romanowski noted, “To a large extent, the U.S. military and others created new constitutions 
and political institutions for both [West Germany and Japan]”, and claimed “this model greatly 
facilitated each country’s redevelopment and reintegration into the community of nations.” 
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However, Romanowski cautioned that postwar Iraq would not be as economically or socially 
weakened as West Germany and Japan were, nor “as open to international management.”167 
 
The Council on Foreign Relations had similar misgivings, arguing: 
 
it will be important to resist the temptation, advanced in various quarters, to establish a 
provisional government in advance of hostilities or to impose a post-conflict 
government, especially one dominated by exiled Iraqi opposition leaders. Such a 
government would lack internal legitimacy and could further destabilize the situation 
inside the country.168 
Polit ical  Reconstruct ion: A quest ion of  agency  
 
Some of the limitation inherent in policymakers’ search for appropriate historical ‘lessons 
learned’ lies in inherent misunderstanding (merely ‘disagreement’ is perhaps too kind) of what 
U.S. reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan attempted, as well as what those efforts 
ultimately achieved. For the Department of Defense, the military’s direct control of state 
reconstruction in Iraq was key, as was the ability to install a friendly exiled government. At the 
Department of State, the FOI working groups maintained that postwar reconstruction efforts 
in West Germany and Japan should be examples for future policy for Iraq, but State cautioned 
against military occupation, instead arguing for the establishment of a technocratic interim 
administration. The CIA characterized the occupations of West Germany and Japan as 
“administration through local officials”, and encouraged similar “indirect administration” in 
Iraq.169 The Department of State’s historian, Marc J. Susser, termed the occupation of Japan 
“unilateral rule” by a military government transitioning to civilian administration,170 but the 
occupation of Germany was termed “shared allied rule”.171 In a distinction without difference, 
the report notes of the Japan experience: 
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The U.S. role during the occupation was one of supervision rather than direct 
administration. There were no “military governors.” Rather, the U.S. appointed 
“military government officers,” who were called “civil affairs officers” after July 1949.172 
 
Later, in a seeming contradiction, the report characterizes General Douglas MacArthur’s 
policies in Japan as “highly centralized” in contrast with the “decentralized occupation policy” 
implemented in Europe.173 The report concludes, “if possible, rule through local officials”,174 
but historical consensus remained elusive. Although ostensibly working from the same models 
of post-World War II reconstruction, each section of government drew divergent lessons from 
those experiences. 
 
Outside the federal government, elites were similarly divided as to whether the post-World 
War II occupations were direct, indirect, or something else entirely. The New America 
Foundation’s James Pinkerton authored the Newsday piece “Iraq Is No Stage for MacArthur-
Japan Sequel”, claiming that the proposed model of occupation rule by a military official with 
“near-dictatorial power” would spark resentment and resistance from Iraq and the region.175 
Analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) characterized the U.S. 
occupation of Japan as one of “direct rule”, and that of West Germany as a case of 
“multilateral administration”.176 
 
Despite disagreement and confusion, U.S. think tanks produced at least one prescient, if quiet, 
critique of this conventional wisdom. An analyst from the centrist Stimson Center, William J. 
Durch, challenged the underlying assumptions of the Bush Administration’s planning, 
questioning proposals for a “MacArthur-like military occupation” of Iraq. His critique is worth 
quoting at length: 
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[The Administration] seems to forget that, after long years of war initiated by Japan, after 
the firebombing of Tokyo and the nuclear incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
Emperor Hirohito ordered national cooperation with the occupation, and it happened, 
because the emperor ruled a nation and was revered above political and military leaders. 
Iraq has attacked its neighbors, been pushed back, and been contained for over a 
decade but not pounded into surrender; it has no emperor-equivalent; and its 23 
million Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, and Arab Iraqis have little experience of freedom and 
perhaps even less love for one another. Political, inter-communal, and criminal 
violence—the secondary explosions ignited by invasion and regime change—could 
substantially postpone or derail hoped-for political and economic transitions.177 
 
Despite significant disagreements over how West Germany and Japan were administered or 
reconstructed, all members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment drew direct links between 
U.S. and Allied policies, and the resulting emergence of liberal democracy in the occupied 
states. The CIA report noted, “Allowing the Germans to craft institutions that matched their 
political and historical traditions facilitated Germany’s successful democratization,”178 while 
Susser termed the post-World War II case studies of Japan and West Germany as unqualified, 
“success stories.”179 For RAND, the example of West Germany underscored the lessons that 
“democracy can be transferred” and “military forces can underpin democratic transformation,” 
while in Japan, key lessons dictated that, “democracy can be exported to non-Western 
societies.”180  
 
The ideas of transportation and exportation of democracy are problematic, particularly given the 
German experience with Weimar era democracy, and Japan’s history of democratic 
constitutionalism that began with the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, and 
continued with a period of reforms during the era of “Taisho Democracy” from 1912-1926. 
While it is far from my intention to assert that Weimar democracy and Taisho democracy were 
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without flaws, it is rather inchoate to claim that post-war occupation was either country’s first 
experience with democratic principles. 
 
The Japanese case lends itself more easily to the argument that democratization was a key goal 
of U.S. reconstruction planners. The Potsdam Declaration called for the removal of “all 
obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people,” and the establishment of “a peacefully inclined and responsible government,” in 
accordance with “the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”181 However, apart from the 
adoption of the constitution, in which U.S. involvement was quite extensive, the influence 
exerted by the U.S. administration upon the Japanese political system was at best minimal and 
at worst ineffective. In one clear example of U.S. efforts to influence the Japanese political 
system, U.S. administrators intervened in the internal elections of Japan’s leftist party in an 
attempt to encourage the formation of a center-left coalition. The effort backfired, leading to 
the rise of a conservative ruling party following the 1949 election.182 Insofar as U.S. policies 
affected democratization efforts in Japan, they are more likely to have hindered than supported 
them. As Moore has argued: 
 
We can acknowledge that Japan is democratic today without agreeing that this 
happy condition is solely the legacy of the Occupation; too many other forces 
have operated in Japanese society both before and after the Occupation for us 
to accept this view without careful qualification.183 
 
In the case of West Germany, the U.S. tendency to ascribe a direct relationship to occupation 
policy and democratization glosses over much of the tension between the U.S. military 
government and domestic German actors. The evolution of political institutions in West 
Germany was resisted by U.S. occupation authorities, in part due to fears that premature 
political development could delay reunification, but also out of concern that political 
reconstruction would result in the type of political centralization that had empowered the Nazi 
regime. U.S. occupation forces were primarily focused on the elimination of Nazi ideology, as 
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evidenced by JCS 1067, or Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation 
Regarding the Military Government of Germany, which was enacted by President Truman on May 
16, 1945.184 This document served as the basis for American occupation and reconstruction 
policy until mid-1947, when a more lenient directive succeeded it, JCS 1779.185 The lessons of 
ideological and civil reconstruction will be discussed later, but with respect to political 
reconstruction JCS 1067 called only for the “eventual reconstruction of German political life 
on a democratic basis,” (emphasis mine)186 seemingly far from an urgent priority. As Tølllefsen 
points out: 
 
Apart from the ban on political activity and organisations, the last half sentence of this 
paragraph is the only mention of democratisation in the whole document. In 
comparison, JCS 1067 included six pages instructing the MG Commander on various 
aspects of denazification and eight pages on Economic and Financial control of the 
American zone.187 
 
During the occupation period, U.S. policy often aimed at preventing—rather than promoting—
German political activity. The U.S. initially banned political activity in its zone, and not until 
the Soviet authorities reauthorized political activity in their zone did the U.S. and Britain move 
to loosen their political restrictions.188 Subsequent U.S. policies facilitated the rehabilitation of 
Weimar era politicians, but at the expense of the suppression of the grass-roots anti-fascist 
(Antifa) movement that was deemed too homologous to socialist and communist mobilization 
occurring in the Soviet sphere. The British were slower to reauthorize political activity in their 
zone (September, as opposed to August 1945), but their decision to allow zone wide, rather 
than merely local forms of political organization explains the later dominance of British zone 
politicians such as Kurt Schumacher (SPD) and Konrad Adenauer (CDU). As Tølllefsen notes: 
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One could even argue that American efforts actually held back restoration of 
democracy in the American zone, effectively turning the American zone, as well as the 
smaller French zone, into a political backwater, subordinates to the growing power of 
the national parties in the British and Soviet zone of occupation.189 
 
Due to disagreements between the Allied occupation powers, agreement to proceed with the 
creation of a West German government was not achieved until spring of 1948.190 Negotiations 
on the parameters of that government continued throughout 1948, as Germans resented the 
extensive Allied restrictions over what was ostensibly to be a sovereign government. As Gimbel 
has shown, Germans felt “the Allies wanted merely to authorize Germans to participate, but 
not to determine policy or proclaim objectives of their own”; “the Germans were being asked 
not to make a constitution, but to create an administrative apparatus for the convenience of 
the Allies.”191 
 
The use of postwar Germany as an example of successful federalism by State and the CIA is 
also curious. The August CIA report claims federalism was successful because it allowed 
Germany’s regions to “express their distinct identities without undermining central authority”. 
This analysis ignores the initial goal of U.S. policy, which as Tølllefsen has argued, “was to 
weaken state power, not to strengthen it.”192 JCS 1067 noted “The principal Allied objective is 
to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world,” and U.S. 
policymakers felt much of the German threat arose from the political and economic 
centralization that occurred under the Nazi regime. The most extreme articulation of this view 
came from U.S. Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who argued for the complete 
dismantling of German industry and the reconstruction of an agrarian state. More moderate 
policies eventually won out, but the federal reconstruction of West Germany was intended to 
weaken, rather than strengthen, state power, and certainly never intended to reinforce central 
authority. In both West Germany and Japan, the primary goal of U.S. occupation was not 
democratization, but rather to achieve extensive ideological transformation of the defeated 
regimes and the populations that had supported them. 
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Economic Reconstruction 
 
On September 8, 2003, President George W. Bush delivered a speech discussing current 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and outlined an imminent request for more resources to 
support ongoing operations. Amidst his discussion of Iraq, Bush called upon the historical 
example of post-World War II reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan: 
 
America has done this kind of work before. Following World War II, we lifted up the 
defeated nations of Japan and Germany, and stood with them as they built 
representative governments. We committed years and resources to this cause. And that 
effort has been repaid many times over in three generations of friendship and peace. 
America today accepts the challenge of helping Iraq in the same spirit – for their sake, 
and for our own.193 
 
This use of historical analogy was more than merely a rhetorical flourish. American officials 
had contemplated historical precedents since at least October 2001, when FOI project was 
launched.194 The construction of a new political regime was foremost on the minds of 
American planners, but details of economic planning enter the conversation slowly. The early 
Rodman memos originating from the Pentagon make no mention of economic reconstruction. 
Thus, an internal Department of State cable from July 8, 2002 is the first available articulation 
of U.S. government goals for the economic reconstruction of Iraq.195 The cable outlines the 
planned establishment of fifteen working groups, including one focused on Economy and 
Infrastructure and another on Oil and Energy.  
 
With respect to economic reconstruction in Iraq, the pre-invasion discourse exhibited three 
main characteristics. First, most elements of the U.S. foreign policy establishment looked to 
Iraq’s oil as a quick means to finance economic recovery. Despite frequent reference to post-
World War II reconstruction efforts, the focus on oil overwhelmed evidence that economic 
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recovery can take large amounts of time, and require extensive initiative from domestic forces. 
Second, the use of post-World War II examples to plan the reconstruction of Iraq’s 
infrastructure rewrote much of the Allied experience in West Germany and Japan, and 
resulted in overly optimistic estimations. Third, U.S. policy planners tended to mythologize the 
role played by the Marshall Plan, misattributing the contemporary neo-liberal economic success 
of Germany and Japan to the direct result of U.S. and Allied reconstruction policies in the 
wake of World War II. Despite significant differences, the experiences of reconstruction in 
West Germany and Japan are often conflated, and an understanding of the domestic forces 
that ultimately fuelled Germany and Japan’s economic recovery is noticeably absent from U.S. 
analysis. Although these three themes are necessarily constitutive of one another, this chapter 
will address them in succession. 
Role of  Oil  
 
Following the invasion and occupation of Iraq, some analysts and commentators argued 
control of Iraq’s oil, or the stabilization of the world oil market, were key incentives driving the 
war. This view is presented by Atif Kurbursi, Daniel Yergin, Michael Klare, and Ian Rutledge 
among others,196 though elements of their analysis have been qualified by writers such as 
Raymond Hinnebusch and Doug Stokes.197 Popularly, the argument that control of Middle 
Eastern oil was a key motivator for U.S. policymakers has been articulated most clearly in the 
American sphere by Rachel Maddow’s MSNBC documentary Why We Did It. However, in my 
analysis of the U.S. government’s internal documents and external statements from the period, 
along with the reports of various Washington think tanks, I have found no evidence to support 
the assertion that American policymakers saw oil as a prime incentive for war. This does not 
mean such evidence does not exist, only that we must wait for abler hands, the passage of time, 
or both, to bring it to light. 
 
Most U.S. policymakers rather looked to Iraq’s oil as a quick means to finance economic 
recovery. State’s FOI working group for Oil and Energy was tasked with developing plans to 
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reconstruct Iraq’s oilfields, along with proposals to evaluate potential foreign investors, and a 
procedure for phasing out domestic energy subsidies.198 The Iraqi members of the working 
group recalled Iraq’s experience with reconstruction in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, and 
were optimistic about a quick refurbishment of the oil industry’s infrastructure.199 Citing a 
strong nationalist ownership of Iraq’s oil sector, the working groups anticipated that coalition 
assistance would only be required for initial security provision, and for recruiting potential 
investors. The rest the Iraqis could handle themselves. However, the State briefer noted doubts 
about Iraqi optimism, questioning the premise of assured investment by international oil 
companies (IOCs): 
 
Energy experts believed that current Iraqi opposition, if put into power, could not 
provide an environment to attract international oil investment into Iraq. IOC’s [sic] 
would look at a chaotic internal political environment and could decide to invest 
elsewhere.200 
 
This brief statement reflects the prescience of which the State reports were occasionally 
capable. Ultimately, the “energy experts” were shown to be correct. While Iraq was able to 
convince some smaller international companies to sign on to develop fields, the larger, more 
advanced IOCs saw little incentive to invest in a politically unstable environment. Many of the 
biggest IOCs signed contracts with the Kurdish Regional Government, but passed on auctions 
offered by Baghdad. 
 
The CIA report analyzing the postwar occupations of West Germany and Japan was short on 
economic recommendations for Iraq’s reconstruction. At its most explicit, the report 
mentioned the potential utility of Iraq’s “wealth of natural resources” or oil, and pointed to 
Iraq’s rationing system and the Oil-for-Food Program as potential examples for postwar 
frameworks.201 State’s FOI reports aslo included helpful analysis of the Oil-for-Food Program. 
The Oil-for-Food Program report outlines the history of the program, including details of its 
establishment, connection to Iraqi state entities, and role in the lives of the Iraqi population. 
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The report’s critical analysis articulates the strengths and weaknesses of the program’s 
administration, and closes with several recommendations for the interim government, 
including a suggestion that the program continue for a maximum of three years during a 
transitional period. 
 
In the Autumn 2002 issue of Survival, Brookings’ analysts Philip Gordon and Michael 
O’Hanlon, this time joined by Martin Indyk, turned briefly to the concerns of post-conflict 
reconstruction. The authors cautioned that, “The United States has not traditionally proven 
very good at making long-term commitments to regional reconstruction,” but they, too, 
reinforce the broader mythology of post-World War II reconstruction, noting, “America did it 
with enormous success in Europe and Japan after the Second World War, and in Korea and 
Taiwan to a lesser degree in the 1950s, but is now wont to use its powerful military forces and 
then leave the reconstruction job to others.”202 Granting short shrift to economic concerns, the 
report noted cursorily that, “Iraq also has considerable economic resources, a consequence of 
its abundant oil reserves, which would make a large-scale donor effort unnecessary.”203 RAND 
concurred, claiming “Iraq’s oil means that the country will not remain dependent on 
international aid in the medium term.”204 
 
The New America Foundation’s contribution to the debate surrounding Iraq’s oil is 
particularly striking. Steve Clemons, the New America Foundation’s Executive Vice President 
and Co-Director of the American Strategy Project penned an opinion piece in early April 2003. 
Clemons encouraged the U.S. to review the example of post-World War II reconstruction in 
Japan, where the U.S. redistributed the holdings of aristocratic landowners to Japanese 
farmers, thus “linking Japan’s most lucrative resource to millions of citizens”.205 Clemons 
encouraged the U.S. to pursue a similar policy in Iraq, by creating an oil investment fund in 
the style of the Alaska Permanent Fund. Like the Alaskan example, Clemons proposed the Iraq 
Permanent Fund be invested in “a diverse set of international equities”, with the dividends 
dispersed to individual Iraqi households. Clemons’s plan for “spreading capital broadly among 
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new stakeholders” is emblematic of the neoliberal free-market approach to development and 
reconstruction, and it quickly drew the attention of members of the U.S. Senate. Two senators 
hailing from oil states, Mary Landrieu (D-LA) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), drafted legislation 
encouraging the Bush administration to adopt Cleamons’s policy as a way to discourage 
corruption and encourage economic development. 206 Secretary of State Colin Powell was said 
to be especially supportive of the proposal.207 
 
Other members of Washington’s think tanks were more pessimistic about using Iraq’s oil 
wealth to finance its economic reconstruction. The Stimson Center argued the immediate 
needs of humanitarian relief, governance, and security would require more funding than could 
be subsidized from Iraq’s oil profits.208 The 2003 CSIS report expressed concerns about Iraq’s 
“enormous” foreign debt burden and the continuing effects of international sanctions. The 
report cautioned that “while Iraq has extensive oil wealth, it will not be able to cover all its own 
post-conflict needs”, further nothing it would be years before oil profits could contribute to 
Iraq’s reconstruction.209 The CFR report was both prescient and cautious. Calling the idea of 
using Iraq’s supposed oil wealth to finance its postwar reconstruction “wishful thinking”, the 
report explained: 
 
Notwithstanding the value of Iraq’s vast oil reserves, there are severe limits on them 
both as a source of funding for post-conflict reconstruction efforts and as the key driver 
of future development. Put simply, we do not anticipate a bonanza.210 
 
The report’s addendum, “Oil and Iraq: Opportunities and Challenges” provided further 
elaboration, stressing the dilapidated state of an Iraqi oil infrastructure held together with 
“band-aids”.211 The CFR working group estimated Iraq’s current oil output at 2.6 to 2.8 
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million barrels per day, and dropping at a rate of approximately 100,000 bpd/year.212 The 
report maintained recovery and reconstruction of Iraq’s oil infrastructure would cost $5 billion 
over as many as three years, with an additional $20 billion required to bring electricity 
production to pre-1990 levels.213 CFR’s assessment contrasted sharply with that of USAID, 
which anticipated electricity could be restored to preconflict levels within 18 months.214 
Infrastructure  
 
Virtually all sectors of the American political establishment anticipated that Iraq’s 
infrastructure would survive the invasion in a functional state. Part of the assessment was based 
on the apparent speed with which Iraq had rebuilt following the first Gulf War, but the 
optimism also resulted from an underestimation of the debilitating effects of many years of 
sanctions and conflict.215  
 
The State Department was the first to begin planning for the economic reconstruction of Iraq. 
The FOI project’s Economy and Infrastructure working group was established to, “plan how 
the post-Saddam government can use economic, legal and financial incentives to rebuild the 
Iraqi economy, create jobs, restore infrastructure, promote international trade and investment, 
and restore the Iraqi economy to sound, modern free-market principles.” State stressed that, 
“Job creation will be an essential priority in shaping Iraqis, [sic] attitudes towards a post-
Saddam Iraqi government.”216 In line with Gordon and Trainor’s assessment, the reports of the 
Economy and Infrastructure working group are of decidedly “uneven” quality, despite meeting 
three times, in October and December of 2002, and again in January 2003.217 The working 
group members produced 18 reports, 12 of which reflected the consensus of all participants. 
The remaining six papers were held to only reflect the views of their authors.218 The consensus 
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documents are the most useful, while those produced by individuals tend to be naively 
optimistic, ideological, and polemical. 
 
One promising initiative that emerged from the working groups deliberations was the proposal 
for an Iraq Development and Reconstruction Council (IDRC). The report on the IDRC 
includes plans for a temporary technocratic institution designed to assist a transitional Iraqi 
government in the post-war reconstruction and economic development of Iraq. The IDRC was 
to be staffed by “qualified Iraqi experts from inside and outside Iraq” assisted by other 
“experienced technocrats whom may or may not be Iraqis.”219 Something very like State’s 
IDRC—the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC)—was established by the 
Pentagon in advance of the U.S. invasion, but it failed to live up to its potential. The IRDC 
reported first to Garner and later to Bremer and the CPA, but was disbanded in June 2004, a 
victim of interagency competition, bureaucratic inefficiency, and American dismissiveness 
toward native Iraqis. Isam al-Khafaji, a professor of political economy at the University of 
Amsterdam and a member of the FOI Democratic Principles working group resigned from the 
IRDC in late July 2003, citing American arrogance, indecision, and the growing chaos in Iraq 
as key factors in his decision to resign.220 
 
USAID’s pre-invasion report “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq” was issued in February 2003. The 
report anticipated that Iraq’s infrastructure would be completely rebuilt within 18 months.221 
Some Washington analysts took USAID at their word. Upon review of the USAID report, 
Michael Knights from the Washington Institute concluded the lessons of destructive Clinton-
era attacks on Iraq had revolutionized the military’s targeting strategies. If USAID expected to 
complete reconstruction on such a short timeline, Knights reasoned, U.S. military targeting for 
the upcoming invasions must “represent an unprecedented attempt to move seamlessly from 
war to reconstruction.”222 The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) asserted that although 
reconstruction in Iraq would face challenges, there was cause for optimism. USIP analysts 
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explained “The country’s infrastructure, though already worn from neglect and additionally 
damaged by war, remains serviceable,” and noted that Iraq was “a sophisticated country”, 
rather than “a struggling developing nation on the brink of disintegration”.223 
 
Analysts from the Stimson Center were uncertain about Iraq’s reconstruction challenges. 
William Durch explained, “Iraq’s infrastructure has not been destroyed by a generation of civil 
wars as in Afghanistan or Angola”, but he noted the effects of the invasion were unpredictable, 
and would depend on both coalition and regime actions.224 The CFR was decidedly more 
pessimistic; it characterized Iraq’s infrastructure problems as “severe”, and noted, “Even 
without a war, Iraq’s infrastructure is likely to be damaged and billions of dollars will be 
required to rehabilitate it.”225 
Neoliberal  Market Emphasis  
 
State’s early FOI reports exhibited a powerful neoliberal flavour. The products of the 
November meeting include consensus reports on “Economic Policy” and “Transforming Iraq’s 
Military Industrial Complex,” along with an individual paper on “Military Industrial 
Corporation”. The Economic Policy report is thick with flowery and ideological platitudes, but 
lacks any usable material of substance, while the paper on Military Industrial Cooperation is so 
disjointed and meandering as to be nearly incoherent. The two-page consensus document on 
Iraq’s military industrial complex (MIC) is the most respectable of the three, helpfully detailing 
the role of the MIC in Iraq’s social, political, and economic fabric, noting the MIC “extends 
Saddam’s power and control over an otherwise unemployable, educated cadre who would be 
dangerous to his state if not kept busy.”226 In a prescient recommendation, the report suggested 
MIC programs not tied to WMD development should continue to function under the interim 
government until budget reviews and personnel screening and retraining can be accomplished. 
 
The reports from the December meetings are of slightly higher quality. However, individual 
reports submitted on a new currency and banking structure were marred by verbose rambling 
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and apparent ideological bias. Characteristic of this trend, the currency report encouraged 
policy planners to reject “failed political ‘command and control’ philosophies like socialism or 
milder ‘welfare and warfare systems’ supported by high taxes.” The author argued such policies 
“bring out the ethical worst in people,” and concluded that choosing “market-based 
participatory communal institutions that bring out the ethical best in people,” was only 
“pragmatic common sense.”227 The consensus paper on establishing a new currency for Iraq 
includes recommendations on interim government polices with respect to monetary policy, 
state revenue projections, inflation, the convoluted history of Iraq's foreign exchange rate and 
import policy, the price structure, public investment, and governmental budget. The paper’s 
contribution is marred by an ideological and largely subsidiary discussion on what images to 
use on the new Iraqi currency, noting that “the dominant ugly picture of the dictator”, in 
addition to the currency’s low value, would ensure Iraqi support for a new currency.228 A later 
footnote indicates that this paper, along with several of the other individually authored papers 
submitted to the working group, was authored by Mr. Rubar Sandi, an American businessman 
who immigrated to the United States from Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s.229 Now the leader of 
The Sandi Group (TSG), a large private international finance, investment and management 
firm based in Washington, D.C., Sandi was involved in several post-war reconstruction 
contracts in Iraq, including serving as a sub-contractor to the U.S. giant, DynCorp.230 TSG has 
since been a party to several legal challenges over its contracting policies, including a 
whistleblower lawsuit wherein TSG settled, and suit which was dismissed under a three-year 
state of limitations.231 
 
In October 2002 the Stimson Center made its contribution to the debate, issuing a series of 
brief essays authored by its regional and technical experts. Several authors critiqued the Bush 
administration’s failure to articulate concrete proposals for a post-conflict Iraq, justifying the 
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hesitancy of the American public and European allies in absence of a clear policy.232 On the 
issue of economic policy however, little was said, with only two pages urging the Bush 
Administration to prepare plans on foreign investment guidelines, trade agreements, and 
export controls for a post-war Iraq.233 The New America Foundation’s proposal for an Iraq 
Permanent Fund also merits special mention, for it is a decidedly creative interpretation of 
history that can draw on the redistributionist example of land reform in Japan, as justification 
for the decidedly neoliberal proposal of encouraging economic development via direct 
payments to individual citizens. Even the May 2003 report by the center-left CEIP supported 
the conventional economic wisdom. Authors Pei and Kasper noted that Japan and West 
Germany “faced little difficulty in using U.S. aid to rebuild their economies,” arguing that “in 
West Germany, the generous aid provided under the Marshall Plan was a critical factor in 
revitalizing the economy.”234 A RAND report from the same period is similarly approving of 
Allied economic reconstruction, noting “British and U.S. economic policies quickly moved 
toward creating an economic environment favourable for business.”235 
Economic Reconstruct ion: At whose hands?  
 
In a recent interview, Jim Miklaszewski, the NBC Pentagon correspondent for the past twenty 
years, explained his experience with the inner workings of Douglas Feith’s Office of Policy 
Planning in the Pentagon: 
 
Doug Feith…told me that they had a Marshall Plan all set to go in terms of rebuilding 
Iraq. And he pointed to this stack of huge three-ringed binders, all of them black. 
There must have been about 10 of them stacked up on top of a cabinet. And I asked to 
see them, and he said, “No, you can’t. It’s classified.” And I said, “Well, O.K., I 
understand that, I guess.” But I raised it to somebody else within the next couple of 
weeks. I said, “Well, Doug Feith showed me the Marshall Plan for Iraq.” And this 
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person laughed, and he said, “Mik, that was the Marshall Plan.” It was a copy of the 
original Marshall Plan, not a plan for Iraq.236 
 
This scene could be taken for little more than a gimmick, showboating on the part of a policy 
hack hoping to overawe a convenient reporter. However, the episode closely parallels President 
Bush’s remarks comparing U.S. efforts in Iraq to policies that “lifted up the defeated nations of 
Japan and Germany” 237 Additionally, former USAID chief Andrew Natsios and former Bush 
cabinet member Jack Kamp are also on record comparing post-conflict reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq to the post-World War II Marshall Plan.238 These episodes are evidence of both the 
rhetorical and cognitive links that U.S. policy makers made between their planning for Iraq, 
and the U.S. post-World War II reconstruction experiences. The divergences, however, 
between post-World War II policy and Iraq policy are staggering. The harsh neo-liberal 
structural adjustments, along with the jarring string of privatizations that accompanied the 
CPA’s economic reforms could not have less in common with the command economy style 
policies of U.S. reconstruction in Germany, or the Keynesian-style policies that characterized 
U.S. efforts in Japan.239 
 
The reports compiled by Susser are especially good examples of this historical mythology. 
Susser’s explanation of the post-World War II occupations argues that U.S. policy insisted “on 
‘just and reasonable’ treatment of civilians and prompt rehabilitation of the civilian economy.” 
The  report does not address the Marshall Plan specifically, though it does touch on the 1947 
zonal economic merger that paved the way for the launch of the European Recovery Program 
(ERP), and the unification of the French, British, and U.S. administered zones as the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949.240 Susser frames the subsequent economic success of West 
Germany as entirely the result of prescient U.S. occupation policy. 
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When it comes to the Marshall Plan, the CIA’s analysis tracks closely with the U.S. 
establishment’s broader consensus. The report argues Germany was able to prosper because of 
“the government’s use of Marshall Plan funds to provide economic advantage to membership 
in the federal system.”241 The CIA report highlights the extensive planning that occurred prior 
to the occupations of Germany and Japan, but repeatedly notes that early U.S. and Allied goals 
for extensive political, social, and economic changes were ultimately scaled back and cancelled 
in the face of unanticipated challenges. The report cautions that “The seven-year occupation 
only laid the groundwork for success—it took a generation change reinforced by the continuing 
presence of US troops to solidify the gains.”242 The CIA report is the only official articulation 
of this point. In this respect, the CIA report gives a better historical account of the postwar 
experience, explicitly noting that Germany and Japan were “not unqualified successes.”243 The 
report explains that Morgenthau’s Plan to eliminate Germany’s industrial capacity was quickly 
scrapped, but it fails to explain the financial and practical reasons that plans to eliminate 
Germany’s industrial capacity were ultimately overturned. The analysis grants too much 
influence to the beginning of the Cold War, and not enough to collective action challenges 
faced by allied occupation administrators. 
 
This understanding of U.S. policy in postwar West Germany and Japan is erroneous for two 
reasons. First, it ignores evidence of the initial goals of the occupations, as well as the 
convoluted path U.S. policy took with respect to reconstruction of the economic power of its 
former adversaries. U.S. occupation policy in both West Germany and Japan was initially 
charged with deconstructing the economic foundation that had supported the military might of 
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In Japan, “economic reconstruction was only prescribed as 
a means of preventing economic crisis and chaos.”244 In West Germany, JCS 1067, which 
guided American policy from the end of the war until currency reform in 1948, was specifically 
targeted at weakening the German economy.245 JCS 1067 mandated that the occupying 
commanders, “take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) 
designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.” In particular, American forces were 
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instructed to keep the German standard of living only at levels “necessary to prevent starvation 
or widespread disease,” but on no account should it be higher than any of the neighbouring 
states.246 The strictures of the JCS 1067 were later elaborated on by The Level of Industry Plan 
(March 1946), in which the Allied Control Council agreed to reduce Germany’s standard of 
living to the 1932 level, while cutting industrial capacity to 50-55 percent of the 1938 level.247 
 
The resistance to full economic reconstruction of Germany continued throughout 1947 and 
1948. In March 1947, as the details of Marshall’s plan for European reconstruction began to 
congeal, President Truman’s reparations advisor, Edwin Pauley warned Truman that following 
Marshall’s proposals: 
 
would restore Germany to the same dominant position of industrial power which it 
held before the war…I cannot avoid looking into the future and contemplating the 
Germany which this plan would produce—a Germany not merely as powerful 
industrially as the Germany of Hitler, but more powerful because of the incredible 
advances of science.248 
 
Jackson has shown the policy of dismantling German industry reached its peak in 1947, but 
continued until at least 1949.249 The policy was advocated by Morgenthau, and supported by 
Roosevelt, his successor Truman, and other key officials in the U.S. government. 
Internationally, the policy of dismantling was supported by Britain, condoned by the Soviet 
Union, and ardently defended by France. The Soviet Union insisted upon dismantling as part 
of its reparations allotment, and professed understandable concern over a military or economic 
resurgence in Germany. France opposed the economic recovery of Germany for the same 
reasons, in addition to fears that domestic outcry over a German revival would bring down the 
French government.250 
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Second, this analysis is representative of an American tradition echoed in President Bush’s 
September speech, where the subsequent development of Germany and Japan into liberal, 
democratic, free-market Western allies is attributed directly to postwar U.S. policy. Such an 
understanding ignores the devastating effects of initial U.S. reconstruction policy. Due to the 
import-export constraints imposed by U.S. policies, a massive food crisis erupted in the 
American zone by the winter of 1946-47, and the economy, such as it was, remained mainly 
barter and black market-based. Not until 1948, when the new Deutschmark was introduced and 
price and state economic controls removed, did the German economy finally begin to 
recover.251 Scholarship questioning the efficacy of the Marshall Plan is even more challenging 
to the conventional understanding of West Germany’s reconstruction. Initial funds were made 
available for France, Italy, and Austria by November of 1947,252 but not for occupied Germany. 
The ERP, which would form the bulk of the economic policy later known as the Marshall Plan, 
was not extended to Germany until the Six-Power Conference in London in spring of 1948, 
and the question of the Ruhr was not settled until late December of that year.253 Milward has 
observed that Marshall aid was low in relation to the gross domestic produce of the target 
countries, and in any event Germany received much less aid per capita than any other major 
recipient.254 What aid was allocated to Germany arrived late, hampered by bureaucratic 
conflicts, confusion, and red tape.255 Alan Milward argues that European integration, generally 
considered the most significant result of the ERP, occurred despite the Marshall Plan, rather 
than because of it.256 The shift within the United States towards rehabilitation rather than 
dismantling of the German economy was late in coming, and more the result of domestic 
forces and the desire among members of the War Department and the U.S. government to 
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limit the financial expense involved in administering occupied Germany.257 The economic 
rehabilitation of West Germany was the result of complex forces, chief among them the 
proposals and demands of German politicians. The mythology of the Marshall Plan present in 
the prewar planning for the reconstruction of Iraq overemphasises U.S. control of postwar 
developments, and credits U.S. policy with achievements that are better seen as the result of 
German aspirations, time, or perhaps even chance. As Stern notes, “[the Marshall Plan] has 
transcended reality and become a myth”.258 
 
The Japanese economic recovery is perhaps more easily linked to postwar planning efforts, but 
even here true economic recovery did not begin until 1950 and 1951, with extensive U.S. 
spending in support of the war effort in Korea.259 This observation is seemingly analogous to 
the state of the U.S. economy in the 1920s and 1930s, which failed to grow in absence of 
wartime spending, despite President Roosevelt’s extensive New Deal policies. What is 
remarkable about the Japanese case is the decidedly Keynesian shape of U.S. reconstruction 
efforts. Early on, General Douglas MacArthur issued a statement to the Japanese government 
detailing the requirements of economic liberalization in occupied Japan. His statement called 
for “the democratization of Japanese economic institutions to the end that monopolistic 
industrial controls be revised through the development of methods which tend to insure a 
wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade,” as well as 
for “encouragement of the unionization of labor” and “full employment in useful work of 
everyone.”260 Such policies offer a sharp contradiction to Allied conventions in Germany, 
where labour organizations were often suspected of harbouring socialist or communist 
sympathisers, and thus discouraged. 
 
Ultimately, it is difficult to determine if the economic recoveries in West Germany and Japan 
occurred as a result of Allied and U.S. policies, or if it was rather an evolution that took place 
independent from (or perhaps even in spite of) those efforts. The prevalent American 
mythology of post-World War II reconstruction conflates subsequent results with initial 
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intentions, overemphasising the effect of U.S. political and economic contributions, while 
discounting powerful domestic forces in Germany and Japan that forged the liberal, free-
market democracies we are familiar with today. 
 
Civil Reconstruction 
 
American pre-war reconstruction planning for civil revival and transitional justice in Iraq drew 
heavily from the historical memory of similar U.S. policies enacted in West Germany and 
Japan following World War II. However, as other scholars have noted, these policies were at 
best inefficient, and many ultimately failed to achieve their objectives.  
Transit ional Just ice and Reconci l iat ion  
 
The FOI Transitional Justice working group was organized “to draft laws to bring Saddam 
Hussein and his top associates to justice.”261 This working group was the first to meet, 
convening early in July 2002, and meeting three more times over the course of 2002 and early 
2003. Its fourth and final meeting occurred from 23 March 23 to April 4, shortly after the 
launch of the U.S. invasion.262 At a September meeting, Dr. Mohammed al-Jabiri proposed 
Saddam Hussein be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity “under international law 
and Iraqi laws from the pre-Saddam period in Iraq.”263 By the next session of the working 
group disagreement had emerged within the ranks. Moniem Al-Khatib, a prominent Iraqi 
lawyer, claimed the Iraqi Military Penal Code and the international covenants and treaties that 
Iraqi remained a signatory to would provide sufficient basis for the trials to be held in Iraq. Dr. 
Rakiah Al-Kayassi explained: 
 
We believe that only an Iraqi court, established under Iraqi law, will have legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Iraqi people. We have studied the lessons of the International Tribunals 
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and we are confident that Iraqis can deal with these crimes 
themselves, with the necessary technical assistance from the international 
community.264 
 
A subsequent press release from the meeting notes that Iraqi legal experts prepared a 600 page 
report including proposals for the reform of Iraq’s legal system, and draft laws to replace those 
used by Saddam Hussein’s regime. The State Department cable from July of 2002 detailed 
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preliminary thoughts on the reconstruction of Iraq’s educational system. The cable identified 
an Education working group tasked with “teaching values of pluralism, tolerance, civic 
responsibility, and rule of law” as well as a curricula overhaul that replace “materials that incite 
hatred and exclusiveness” with those that “promote tolerance of diversity”.265 The Education 
working group met November 25-26, 2002.266 The CIA report also stressed that educational 
reform “would be a requirement in any political transformation of Iraq.”267 
 
The Transitional Justice working group intended “to draft an amnesty decree and a truth-and-
reconciliation process for the rest of Iraqi society”, as well as spearheading an investigation and 
documentation effort of violations of human rights that occurred under Saddam’s rule.268 The 
July 2002 cable contained specific guidance to U.S. missions in Pretoria, Buenos Aires, and 
Santiago. The embassy in Pretoria was instructed to “suggest that South Africa’s experience in 
developing a process to promote truth and reconciliation would be particularly welcome in the 
working group on Transitional Justice”.269 Embassies in Buenos Aires and Santiago were 
ordered to convey that “free Iraqis have impressed upon United States officials that post-
Saddam Iraq would benefit from learning about Argentina’s and Chile’s experienced in 
making the transition from a military regime to democracy.”270 State’s priorities were seconded 
by elements of Washington’s think-tank community. The Washington Institute’s report termed 
the establishment of a truth and reconciliation “absolutely essential”271 
Conversely, the CSIS report intentionally avoided detailing proposals for a process of 
transitional justice in Iraq despite the Bush Administration’s preference for a South African-
style Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The CSIS report stressed “any reconciliation 
process must be Iraqi-driven, not imposed from the outside”.272 In particular, CSIS encouraged 
a United Nations-appointed neutral arbiter (“ideally an Iraqi”) to oversee a “national dialogue 
process” aimed at encouraging both diaspora Iraqis and those who had remained in Iraq to 
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negotiate the parameters of a reconciliation commission or a general amnesty.273 CEIP, too, 
advocated the United States “step back as much as possible”, and allow Iraqis to take control of 
the process of justice and reconciliation. CEIP analysts were concerned that allowing the U.S. 
to impose a system of justice, “may keep Iraqis from coming to grips with the past and healing 
divisions”.274 The scholars cautioned that if the United States found itself too involved with the 
process of transitional justice, “Washington will find itself perpetually tested and judged for 
even-handedness on a whole array of local issues for which there is no good, or even fair, 
answer.”275 The policies articulated by CSIS and CEIP were thus entirely opposed to the legal 
drafting and decision making then occurring in the FOI working group. 
De-Ba’athif ication  
 
In its formulation of U.S. policy to reconstruction the civic and political ideology of the new 
Iraqi state, the U.S. Department of State turned to the historical examples of state 
reconstruction in West Germany and Japan. The report from the FOI project’s Democratic 
Principles working group noted, “The examples of the de-Nazification of members of the Nazi 
Party following the end of the Second World War and the lustration laws implemented in the 
former Eastern European countries may prove helpful for purposes of de-Ba’athification.”276 
However, State saw “de-ideologization” as the most critical part of the proposed de-
Ba’athification program, drawing a distinction between the Ba’ath Party’s influence on Iraqi 
culture, and the influence wielded by Saddam Hussein’s regime. The report noted that “De-
ideologization, while less measurable, is arguably the most important and the most difficult of 
the tasks of the de-Ba’athification program”.277 Members of the working group underscored 
this distinction, and the report notes, “Some members of the working group object to the use 
of the term “de-Ba’athification.” They suggest instead replacing the terms “Ba’ath” and “de-
Ba’athification,” with “Saddam”, “Saddamism” and “de-Saddamification”, wherever these 
appear in the report.”278 Members of the working group disagreed about how members of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime should be treated by a reconstructed Iraqi state, with proposals 
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favouring anything from amnesty to disbanding the entire structure of the Ba’ath Party and the 
security services.279 
 
The CIA’s analysis touched briefly on the issue of post-invasion purges, noting “The United 
States began the occupations of Germany and Japan with the goal of finding, removing from 
public life, and punishing war criminals.” However, the report cautions that U.S. goals were 
limited by “the need to rely on local institutions and leaders” and concludes, “In the end, few 
German and Japanese were permanently barred from public life.”280 In February 2003, the 
Department of State’s historian added his own historical analogies into the mix. Recalling the 
lessons of post-World War II reconstruction efforts, Susser pointed to the purges that paved 
the way for democracy in West Germany and Japan. Building chiefly upon historical examples, 
Susser concludes with several “key factors” of occupation and post-war government, including 
that “old ideologies must be discredited” and occupation authorities must “weed out the most 
fanatic supporters of the ousted regime” 281 
 
The U.S. foreign policy community was divided as to the wisdom or efficacy of stringent purges 
of Iraq’s institutions. Several institutions, among them the Pentagon and USIP, proposed 
strong U.S. action on the subject. Building upon the examples of civil reconstruction in West 
Germany, USIP analysts stressed, “Above all, Clay was to preside over the denazification of the 
German psyche”.282 USIP’s rhetoric was particularly strident, encouraging “prompt and 
thorough political decontamination and de-Ba’athification of Iraq” by urging the United States 
to “purge Ba’athists from high-ranking civil and military positions”.283 
 
Other institutes, among them Brookings, the CFR, CSIS, CEIP and the Washington Institute 
took a more cautious approach, preferring the U.S. retain the expertise of all but a few senior 
bureaucrats. Although the term “de-Ba’athification” has figured prominently in subsequent 
critiques of U.S. state reconstruction policy in Iraq, the term itself did not occur until later in 
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the process of public debate. The term does not appear in early Brookings reports from 2002, 
and press releases from the September 2002 and January 2003 meetings of State’s Transitional 
Justice working group make no mention of the term. The term’s earliest appearance in U.S. 
foreign policy discourse occurs in the January 2003 CSIS report, which anticipated that “senior 
Ba’ath party functionaries and members of the security forces will presumably be removed from 
the police force as part of a de-Ba’athification process,284 but the term may have been in use 
previously.285 The final FOI working group report from March 2003 contains entire sections 
devoted to “De-Ba’athification.” 
 
Both Brookings and CFR sought (unsuccessfully) to encourage U.S. policy to focus on Saddam 
Hussein’s political role in Iraq, rather than the role of the moribund Ba’ath party. The 
Autumn 2002 Survival article authored by three Brookings analysts details proposals for the 
reconstruction of Iraq, but makes no mention of a purge of officials from Saddam’s regime, or 
of any process of “de-Ba’athification.”286 A subsequent report from Brookings’ analyst Daniel L. 
Byman argues, ‘Saddamisation’ rather than ‘Ba’athisation’ is the more accurate term for the 
political ill facing post-invasion Iraq,287 thus advocating a policy more in line with proposals 
from State. The CFR report from January 2003 utilizes the term “de-Saddamization”, and is 
mostly concerned with the removal of a thin layer of politically compromised officials at the 
most senior levels of Iraq’s bureaucracies and military. 
 
Other voices that argued for a minimal purge of Iraq’s institutions did so for practical reasons. 
CSIS argued for a minimalist and structured approach to de-Ba’athification, and proposed that 
the U.N. supervised transitional authority “should emphasize maximum use of the existing 
Iraqi civil service at the local and national levels”.288 The report was optimistic about 
democratic transformation in Iraq, noting, “In contrast to Afghanistan, Iraq is far from a failed 
state. It has a centralized government with a functioning bureaucracy; indeed, it would be 
counterproductive if the existing Iraqi administration were purged too radically.”289 CEIP was 
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more blunt, warning “a thorough de-Ba’athification would eviscerate the existing Iraqi state, at 
least for the short term.”290 
 
The Washington Institute held a similarly pessimistic view of the de-Ba’athification process. 
Jeffrey White argued in spring 2003 that, “complicity in the crimes of the regime is not limited 
to senior officials, but reaches deep into the extended apparatus of the government”.291 White 
encouraged intelligence services and the military to begin documenting the role of senior Iraqi 
officials in human rights abuses, enabling later legal action. White cautioned, “finding 
untainted (or even merely compliant) individuals to assume these roles could prove a difficult, 
error-prone, and protracted task.” CEIP analysts cautioned of the challenges the U.S. would 
face, and used examples from World War II reconstruction efforts to drive home their point: 
 
In both Germany and Japan, the United States curtailed the purge of the militaristic 
old regime’s loyalists and left most civil servants and business elites untouched. In 
Japan, for example, out of 2.5 million cases investigated, only 40,000—fewer than 2 
percent—of the politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople with ties to the old regime 
were purged from power. After the occupation, many of these disgraced elements of the 
old regime regained their political rights; in the first post-occupation Diet election, they 
accounted for 42 percent of the winning candidates.292 
 
This emphasis of the limits of U.S. occupation and reconstruction power came too late in the 
policy debate. 
Resurrect ion of  a Fai led Model  
 
In the cases of West Germany and Japan, the primary goal of U.S. occupation was to achieve 
extensive ideological transformation of the defeated regimes and the populations that had 
supported them. In the German context, this meant the elimination of Nazi ideology. JCS 
1067 instructed the occupation forces in the ideological transformation deemed necessary for 
German reconstruction, asserting, “The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from 
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ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world”. To do so, the document charged 
occupation authorities with “the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms,” and 
“the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment.”293 Nazi militarism was 
understood as the ideological force that had corrupted the German political sphere, and only 
with the purging of key Nazi sympathisers could the “eventual reconstruction of German 
political life on a democratic basis,” occur.294 
 
Some of the most detailed directives in the JCS 1067 concern the subject of de-Nazification, 
but it is important not to overstate the success of the Allied policy. Although the 
demilitarisation procedures succeeded in completely dismantling and disarming the German 
Wehrmacht and the population at large, it is not clear that the denazification procedures were 
equally successful.295 The policy proved to be not only overly ambitions, but also extremely 
difficult to administer. Efforts to classify degree of Nazi affiliation were obscure and subjective, 
leading to oftentimes arbitrary enforcement of the regulations. While only one tenth of the 
adult German population had claimed membership in the Nazi party,296 the removal of low 
level party members and affiliates elicited serious practical and ethical problems at a time when 
Germany was struggling to rebuild its infrastructure and recover economically. As Tony Judt 
explained, it very quickly became clear “that Germany (and Austria) could not be returned to 
civil administration and local self-government…if the purging of responsible Nazis was 
undertaken in a sustained and consistent manner.”297 The Congressional committee 
investigating Allied denazification policy concluded in its final report that, “It seems reasonably 
clear now that the American denazification policy went too far and tried to include too many. 
Its categorization was too broad and too rapidly applied.”298 Congressional pressure on the 
military government during the fall of 1947 forced a closure of the denazification programme 
by May 1948, as it was determined that the programme was hindering more crucial efforts at 
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economic recovery.299 Denazification was a dead letter by the early 1950s, a conclusion Judt 
maintained “would have been all but unthinkable in 1945.”300 
 
Efforts at ideological transformation were similarly prominent in the reconstruction of Japan, 
where policy objectives were primarily embodied in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 
1945.301 As the first term of Japanese surrender, and thus the primary requirement for Japan’s 
reconstruction and the end of the military occupation, the Potsdam Declaration declared: 
 
There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have 
deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we 
insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until 
irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.302 
 
By taking aim at Japanese militarism, the U.S. approach to Japanese reconstruction differed 
markedly from its approach to Germany. Demilitarization in Japan focused on “dissolving 
militaristic, ultranationalist, and secret patriotic societies,” as well as “preparing directives for 
the removal and exclusion from public office of exponents of militaristic nationalism and 
influential members of the secret societies.”303 This difference was due to the prominence of 
certain “old Japan hands” from the State Department in the post-war planning process for 
Japan. Individuals such as Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew and head of SWNCC’s 
Subcommittee on the Far East Eugene Dooman asserted that the militarism of World War II 
was an “aberration” in Japanese history, making the only major objective of the occupation “to 
eliminate military control of Japan and free the moderate and liberal forces that were believed 
to exist in Japanese society.”304 For this reason, U.S. authorities administered Japan largely 
through the Japanese civilian bureaucracy, and political purges were of a smaller magnitude. 
While denazification efforts affected 2.5 percent of the German population, similar purges in 
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Japan affected only .29 percent of the population.305 Although U.S. reconstruction and re-
education policies in Japan are commonly asserted to be of crucial importance to the Japanese 
shift from militant nationalism to peaceful democratization, it is unclear from the historical 
analysis what effect, if any, the U.S. policies may have had.306 Furthermore, later Japanese 
governmental review of the purges in 1951 resulted in uniform rehabilitation of purged 
individuals and the immediate release of those still in prison.307 Upon review, it appears that 
innate Japanese democratic principals, which existed prior to the militarism of the 1930s and 
40s, may be more responsible than Allied reconstruction policies for the peaceful trajectory of 
Japanese development in the postwar period. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This project has sought to inform understandings of the liberal peace and liberal 
reconstruction, by examining the positionality of prewar planning for Iraq’s reconstruction 
from the perspective of U.S. policymakers in advance of the 2003 U.S. invasion and 
occupation of Iraq. By examining documentary evidence from within the administration, as 
well as public documents produced by Washington’s foreign policy think tanks, I have sought 
to understand how U.S. policymakers understood their current project in Iraq, in light of past 
examples of intervention and reconstruction. By examining the process of policy articulation 
from the perspective of its architects, this project hopes to contribute to our understanding the 
formation and articulation of foreign policy goals, along with the importance of institutional 
and cultural memory in foreign policymaking. 
The Rhetoric  of  History  
 
This project has sought to understand how the U.S. discourse of post-conflict reconstruction 
prior to the 2003 invasion utilized the cases of West Germany and Japan. The rhetorical link 
between Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Nazi Germany’s Adolf Hitler had been promoted through 
the rhetoric of U.S. officials since at least 1990, when Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was framed by 
President George H. W. Bush as analogous to Germany’s aggression across Europe during 
World War II.308 In deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush maintained, “if history 
teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. 
Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an 
aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.”309 In 1991, Bush asserted “Saddam Hussein is 
literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth”,310 and in 1992, he characterized 
Saddam Hussein’s actions as “a threat to decency and humanity”, claiming that “Saddam 
Hussein’s unprovoked invasion, his ruthless, systematic rape of a peaceful neighbor, violated 
                                                
308 Russell A. Berman, “Saddam as Hitler,” in Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem, (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2004), 90-91. 
309 George H. W. Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to 
Saudi Arabia," 08 August 1990, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18750. 
310 George H. W. Bush, “Toward a New World Order,” 1991, in The Geopolitics Reader, ed. Gearoid O Tuathail et 
al. (London: Routledge, 1998), 132. 
  80 
everything the community of nations holds dear.”311 Timothy W. Luke terms this phenomenon 
a “retro-war”: the tendency of American officials to frame emerging conflicts in the guise of old 
ones. Luke explains, “World War II remains deeply entrenched, symbolically and rhetorically, 
as the Western world’s vision of a “just war.”” Thus: 
 
Whenever and wherever a small, weak nation is threatened by a larger, stronger nation, 
or a militaristic authoritarian dictator challenges a relatively peaceful neighboring 
society, the discursive work-ups of World War II can be flexibly deployed to interpret, 
explain, and legitimate elite and mass responses in readily accessible and virtually 
uncontestable rhetorical terms.312 
 
Building on research from psychology, Dodge understands this tendency as the Bush 
administration’s conception of conflict with Iraq through a “diabolical enemy image schema”, 
wherein one society can be viewed as “morally superior, acting with unquestionable motives” 
while the other possesses “all the traits of an ideal-type enemy”.313 Berman has argued the 
phenomenon “has to be seen not only as the rhetoric of the moment but as part of the 
tradition, perhaps distinctively American, of focusing on the personal responsibility of the 
adversary leader.”314 While elements of this schema emerged over the course of the earlier Bush 
and Clinton administrations, the post-9/11 Bush Administration expanded this link, building 
an analogy that compared the current U.S. conflict with Iraq with the historical conflict with 
Nazi Germany during the Second World War. This rhetorical link relies on pathos rather than 
logos, for while the use of chemical weapons against civilians lends itself to memories of 
genocidal gas chambers, the U.S. conflict with Germany lacked a similarly powerful beginning. 
Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, pundits and government officials drew 
comparisons between Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York. 
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On August 26, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney delivered a speech to the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, utilizing rhetoric which drew implicit parallels between Pearl Harbor, 9/11, 
Saddam Hussein, and Adolf Hitler. Cheney stated Saddam Hussein sought weapons of mass 
destruction “for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale”, and may “seek domination 
of the entire Middle East”.315 Cheney followed this description of Saddam Hussein with a 
segue into the history of World War II, noting the United States would “profit…from a review 
of our own history”, and from questioning how Pearl Harbor, along with “the tragedies that 
rate among the worst in human history” might have been prevented. Cheney’s line questioning 
“how we might have prevented Pearl Harbor” is shortly thereafter paralleled with a 
hypothetical, questioning “If the United States could have pre-empted 9/11.” In this way 
Cheney created a rhetorical link between Adolf Hitler’s war of aggression across Europe and 
the prospect of Saddam Hussein’s domination of the Middle East; between the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center; between the Holocaust 
and the spectre of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. That this lesson in history conflates 
historical actors, events, and spurious accusations was lost on Cheney’s audience; the transcript 
notes his comments were met with applause. 
 
On January 30, 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush’s delivered a now infamous State of the 
Union speech, containing a new articulation of the “Axis of Evil”, and drawing powerful 
parallels between the evolving conflict with Iraq, and historical conflicts with Nazi Germany, 
Imperial Japan, and Mussolini’s Italy. Bush stated, “This is a regime that has already used 
poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over 
their dead children,”316 His 2003 State of the Union address was even more explicit, warning 
that armed with weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein “could resume his ambitions of 
conquest” and “create deadly havoc” in the Middle East. 
 
On February 14, 2003, Rumsfeld delivered a speech in New York entitled “Beyond Nation 
Building”. Standing on the deck of the USS Intrepid (a former naval aircraft carrier now turned 
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museum), Rumsfeld drew parallels between the Japanese “suicide bombers” who attacked the 
U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor and the suicide bombers who “struck again”, against the World 
Trade Center towers in New York.317 Rumsfeld then recounted U.S. reconstruction efforts 
following World War II, and claimed Japan’s contemporary prosperity as the direct result of 
U.S. postwar policy: 
 
After Pearl Harbor our country fought back and defeated those who attacked it…And 
when the hostilities ended after World War II we helped the Japanese people rebuild 
from the rubble of war and establish institutions of democracy. Today Japan is of 
course a staunch friend and a steadfast U.S. ally.318 
 
Rumsfeld emphasized that for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, “The objective is not to engage in 
what some call nationbuilding,” as nationbuilding can distort domestic economies and create 
“dependency”. Rumsfeld discounted the examples of East Timor and Kosovo, asking instead 
“what lessons our experience in Afghanistan might offer for the possibility of a post-Saddam 
Iraq.” Laying out a vision wherein “Iraqis can form a government in their own unique way”, 
Rumsfeld pointed to two respects in which Iraq’s reconstruction had advantages over the 
Afghan experience. First, Rumsfeld noted the advantage of time, as the Pentagon’s Post War 
Planning Office and General Franks have “been working hard on this for many months”. 
Second, he highlighted Iraq’s resources, noting Iraq’s “solid infrastructure” and oil, which 
would “give free Iraq the means to get on its feet”. 
 
This penchant for historical analogy did not end with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Bob 
Woodward relates a conversation between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and 
President George W. Bush during an official visit to Japan in October 2003. Bush told 
Koizumi: 
 
If we hadn’t gotten it right in 1945 and helped build a democratically prosperous 
Japan, our conversation—between a Japanese prime minister and a president of the 
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United States—could never take place. One day, a president of Iraq and a president of 
the United States are going to be sitting there trying to solve some problem and they’re 
going to say they’re glad we created a democratic and prosperous Iraq.319 
 
It could be argued these statements are merely rhetorical flourishes: that policy makers call 
upon the examples of World War II in order to illustrate their points, or to appeal to a 
patriotic audience. If public speeches were the only medium where such analogies could be 
found this view would have merit, but as has been shown previously, these analogies are 
present throughout internal government memos and classified reports. Dodge has meticulously 
laid out how this ‘diabolical enemy-image’ was constructed and articulated by key members of 
the Bush administration, including the Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and Bremer.320 The 
thinking of policy architects is important to understanding their planning on Iraq, but the 
broader point is the extent to which use of these historical analogies was replicated by other 
segments of the U.S. government, and by the broader U.S. foreign policy community 
represented by the most prominent Washington think tanks. That similar historical analogies 
were used by broad swaths of the U.S. foreign policy community, even by ostensibly 
ideologically opposed research institutions, is striking. 
Dominated by Conventional Wisdom 
 
The second question this dissertation sought to answer, was whether U.S. policymakers 
accurately understood the original goals and ‘lessons’ of post-World War II reconstruction? 
The conclusion reached is decidedly negative. The largest factor contributing to the 
misinformation and miscalculation surrounding Iraq is not right-wing hawkishness, or left-wing 
ineffectiveness, but rather a common mythology that is neither liberal, nor conservative, but 
altogether American. The narrative of American exceptionalism that takes the success of post-
World War II reconstruction as unequivocal underscores which actions and policies appear 
feasible to U.S. policymakers. CEIP calls the cases of West Germany and Japan, “unambiguous 
successes,” while RAND asserts “the cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for postconflict 
nation-building that has not since been matched.”321 RAND’s James Dobbins maintained in 
the aftermath of the Iraq invasion that reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan 
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“were more unambiguously successful than even the best-managed of the post-Cold War 
missions.”322 Despite a rather grim consensus surrounding the remaining attempts at post-
conflict reconstruction, it is the seemingly shining examples of West Germany and Japan that 
underpin numerous assessments about what sort of transformation is possible. To be sure, 
subsequent analyses have underscored the extent to which West Germany and Japan present 
unique (and perhaps irreplicable) examples of postwar reconstruction, but even those analyses 
accept the conventional wisdom that Allied reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan 
were not only undoubtedly ‘successful,’ but also absolutely necessary.323 Bellin even claims the 
examples of West Germany and Japan prove the added value of military occupation for 
democratization, arguing such intervention “was essential to steering both countries onto a 
democratic track.”324 
 
CEIP and USIP, supposed bastions of liberal U.S. policy, endorse many of the same ideas 
about the postwar experience that Feith and Rumsfeld articulated from inside the Pentagon. 
And although the Department of State's Future of Iraq project was more detailed and 
nuanced—with properly footnoted diplomatic caveats—State’s operatives ascribed to the same 
sense of history as their military counterparts. Their analysis was representative of an American 
tradition where the subsequent development of Germany and Japan into liberal, democratic, 
free-market Western allies is attributed directly to postwar U.S. policy. This mythology 
misremembers the initial, less enlightened, goals of the occupation, instead conflating 
subsequent results with initial intentions. It overemphasises the effect of U.S. political and 
economic contributions, while discounting the powerful domestic forces in Germany and 
Japan that forged the liberal, free-market democracies we are familiar with today. 
 
Despite significant differences in case selection and methodology, the U.S. literature on 
reconstruction achieves consensus in the unequivocal success of post-World War II 
reconstruction efforts in West Germany and Japan. In fact, aside from a negative assessment of 
mid-90s efforts in Haiti, and an understandable hesitance toward any decision on the situation 
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in Afghanistan, a unanimous consensus on the success of reconstruction efforts in West 
Germany and Japan is the only salient point upon which the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, the CIA, and the relevant Washington think tanks agree. This historical 
mythology is present in equal parts among liberals and conservatives; it is truly a bipartisan 
(mis)understanding of history. The preceding critique of this historiography has tried to open 
space in the discourse to question what happens to the conventional analysis when the results 
of reconstruction experiences in Japan and West Germany are re-examined. Absent West 
Germany and Japan, the cohort of successfully reconstructed nations includes only Panama 
and Grenada. Although Pei and his co-authors term U.S. efforts in Panama a success, 
Brownlee notes that they “do not explain why America’s brief nation-building effort in Panama 
in 1989 ostensibly bestowed a more democratic legacy than its lengthy involvement from 1903 
to 1936”.325 Under these conditions, Pei and Kasper’s conclusions become ever more 
questionable, and their ratio for success in American nation-building efforts would plunge 
from a tepid 26%, to a more dismal 13%.326 With odds like these, how could anyone advocate 
for invasion and reconstruction at all? 
 
Although Japan and Germany have become successful liberal democracies, it is not enough to 
ask what the target state has become. More important is to ask what effect U.S. occupation 
policy had on that development, and here the answers are much less clear cut. If it cannot be 
clearly shown that U.S. policy was successful—if, indeed, we can locate no clear examples where 
“nation building” has succeeded—then it is unclear there is much of a case to make for the 
success of postwar reconstruction in the future. Some things are beyond the powers of 
occupying armies, and constructing stable, peaceful, democratic states from the remnants of 
postconflict society may well be one of them. As Brownlee maintains, “If the conditions in 
Germany and Japan are any indication, nation-building success has hinged less on what occurs 
within Washington and more on the prior experiences of the target societies.”327 
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Although 'lessons learned' from West Germany and Japan dominated the prewar Iraq 
reconstruction discourse, three exceptions are worthy of mention. First, the Brookings 
Institution spent much of the lead-up to the invasion fixated on the example of Panama, 
utilizing it in a Survival article, Congressional testimony, and three op-eds. Michael O’Hanlon 
and retired colonel James Reed noted the incongruence between Panama and Iraq, explaining 
“Iraq is five times the size of Panama, with a population almost 10 times as great and a military 
nearly 100 times as large”, and yet they concluded, “Despite differences in scale, urban combat 
in Baghdad, as in Panama, will likely present similar challenges…But on balance, U.S. forces 
could take control of Baghdad almost as quickly as they did Panama City.”328 It is not clear 
where the Brookings analysts drew their Panamanian inspiration, or why they ultimately 
ignored the plethora of distinctions between Panama and Iraq. Writing concurrently about 
Panama, USIP cites Roy Licklider’s 1999 piece in Small Wars and Insurgencies; Brookings 
provides no such reference. However, Reed had previously written on the U.S. military’s 
experience in Panama. In a 1993 post-mortem of the Gulf War with clear parallels to 
Peterson’s subsequent post-mortem of the Iraq invasion, Reed published an article in the U.S. 
Army War College’s journal Parameters. Arguing that “war termination should perhaps be 
assigned a higher priority” in U.S. military planning, Reed utilized “The chaotic aftermath of 
the 1989 US invasion of Panama” as an example of what the U.S. military must work to 
avoid.329 Over the space of ten years, Reed entirely reversed his assessment. 
 
Second, the analysis of the Washington Institute also diverged from the conventional narrative 
of post-World War II, but its analysis of the post-World War I British experience in Iraq 
proved both logical and prescient. However, even within that analysis, elements of the 
conventional narrative remain. In the Washington Institute’s comprehensive report, Peter 
Sluglett notes that while the prospect of reconstruction in Iraq is “obviously daunting”, hope 
can be gleaned from the success of “an even more ambitious enterprise”, namely, the post-war 
reconstruction of West Germany and Japan.330 
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Finally, in my examination of discourse produced by members of the U.S. government and 
foreign policy elites in Washington think tanks, I encountered only one example of clear 
divergence from the common narrative promoting the reconstruction in West Germany and 
Japan as examples for post-invasion policy in Iraq. In December 2002, an eleven-page draft 
memo by CSIS expert Anthony H. Cordesman circulated through Washington, and by the end 
of the month was posted to CSIS’s website. Cordesman’s memo is a blunt force attack on the 
“ignorance, indifference…and ethnocentricity” that characterized Washington’s planning for 
the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq.331 He explicitly takes aim at the historical mythologies 
overtaking the planning process, noting “A little self-honesty about our past mistakes in nation 
building and occupation would help; especially when we perpetuate the myth we did so 
splendidly in Germany and Japan.” Cordesman argues “things eventually worked out in 
Germany and Japan” due to processes the U.S. adopted “only under duress”.332 
 
It is useful to ask—with the added benefit of hindsight—how Cordesman’s critiques could have 
been so prescient. Unusually for the vitriolic world of Washington’s foreign policy circles, 
Cordesman receives grudging respect from each side of D.C.’s political fringe. Conservative 
political commentator Charles Krauthammer has praised Cordesman as “a hardheaded 
realist,”333 while Alexander Cockburn, editor of the leftist magazine Counterpunch, admitted 
that, despite Cordesman’s extensive credentials as a government yes-man, he is “a pretty smart 
fellow.”334 Cockburn concludes Cordesman’s memo was merely an effort to ensure he had 
placed an “I told you so” on record, but it is equally possible to see elements of past 
Republican policy in Cordesman’s pessimism. Cordesman is perhaps one of the last remaining 
examples of what Republican-style internationalism looked like under presidents Regan and 
Bush, or at least what it looked like in Europe and Asia. His concerns were not substantially 
different than those expressed quietly—and less publicly—by former Secretary of State Colin 
Powell. 
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The Loyal “Opposit ion”  
 
The role of D.C. area think-tanks in shaping the pre-war Iraq reconstruction discourse is 
difficult to determine. We know that Bremer read RAND’s 2003 report America’s Role in 
Nation-Building, and found it compelling enough to forward along to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and 
Feith. Bremer’s key take-aways from the RAND report appear to have been the need for a 
significant number of troops during the post-invasion phase, extensive economic assistance, 
“keeping a close eye on Iranian objectives and activities”, and “the need to stress to all 
concerned that this will be a long process.” 335 Bremer highlighted Dobbins et al.’s conclusion 
that “No effort at democratization has taken hold in less than five years”.336 No record of 
Rumsfeld’s response to Bremer’s memo is available. It is also difficult to determine to what 
extent Washington’s think tanks were cognisant of analysis emanating from rival (or allied) 
institutions. USIP senior fellow Ray Salvatore Jennings referenced an op-ed by CEIP’s Pei and 
Kasper, but not the report that op-ed was based upon. Brookings’s summer contribution to 
Survival referenced the CSIS report and several pieces from The Washington Institute’s 
Policywatch series, but none of the other preceding reports from the think tank community. Of 
the more comprehensive reports produced by CFR, the Baker Institute, RAND, and CSIS, 
only the RAND report contains citations or references of any kind. It lists CSIS, the 
Washington Institute, and CFR/Baker reports in its bibliography, but makes no specific 
reference to them in footnotes. 
Flawed Analysis 
 
Although much attention has been given to the miscalculations of senior government officials 
during the prewar reconstruction of Iraq, their liberal counterparts were scarcely more 
prescient. A few examples from the Brookings Institution merit mention. Brookings analyst 
Susan Rice (Ambassador to the United Nations and later National Security Advisor under 
Barack Obama) is on the record saying of Colin Powell’s now infamous speech at the United 
Nations, "I think he has proved that Iraq has these weapons and is hiding them, and I don't 
think many informed people doubted that.” 337 Her comments represent a critical 
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miscalculation, but the limitations and failures of the Brookings analysts extend beyond Rice’s 
acceptance of administration claims about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Senior 
Brookings Fellow Michael E. O’Hanlon drastically misread the internal dynamics of the Bush 
Administration, arguing that Powell’s UN speech showed he had “carried the day on what may 
be the most important national security debate of the Bush presidency.”338 We now know 
Powell’s presentation at the UN was a symbol of his increasing lack of traction within the Oval 
Office, and Powell has himself described the event as “a blot”, which tarnished his reputation. 
“I'm the one who presented it on behalf of the United States to the world,” he told ABC’s 
Barbara Walters in an interview following his departure from the administration, “[It] will 
always be a part of my record. It was painful. It's painful now.”339 In his commentary on the 
speech, O’Hanlon rhetorically asked, “how do we know that these are not all tactics, designed 
to provide multilateral camouflage for an administration plan for a largely unilateral war?” It is 
now clear that Powell’s speech was precisely that sort of tactic, but O’Hanlon somehow 
concluded that “despite the continued flow of military supplies to the Persian Gulf,” such a 
scenario was “highly improbable.”340 
Disagreements 
 
There were sharp divisions among the U.S. policy elite about how lengthy the commitment to 
Iraq’s reconstruction should be. However, these differences do not track clearly along 
ideological lines. Whether due to unfounded optimism, or “misplaced complacency”, as 
former Coalition Forces engineer Richard H. Brown has termed it, staffers in the Pentagon 
and members of the Defense Policy Board proposed relatively short reconstruction 
timeframes.341 USAID’s pre-invasion report “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq” from February 2003 
famously anticipated that Iraq’s infrastructure would be completely rebuilt within eighteen 
months.342 Members of the think-tank community supported proposals for short timeframes, 
but for more cynical reasons. Centrist institutes such as CFR and the Baker Institute resisted 
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proposals for a long-term U.S. commitment in Iraq. The CFR report noted “The continued 
public discussion of a U.S. military government along the lines of post-war Japan or Germany 
is unhelpful…such comparisons suggest a long-term U.S. occupation of Iraq that will neither 
advance U.S. interest nor garner outside support.”343 Members of the Washington Institute 
echoed these concerns. Deputy Director Patrick Clawson argued the postwar occupation of 
Iraq should end “as quickly as possible” (maximum one year) so as to avoid “engendering a 
nationalistic revolt” within Iraq.344 Similarly, analysts from CEIP argued for a shorter 
occupation, cautioning that an extended presence in Iraq would be both detrimental and 
wasteful. “The United States should not try to prolong the occupation,” CEIP analysts argued, 
“A long occupation would…be a costly and futile undertaking. It would also be politically 
dangerous for the United States.”345 
 
Other think tank analysts argued the U.S. should brace for a long-term commitment to Iraq, 
stretching anywhere from several years to several generations. CSIS maintained a commitment 
of one year was insufficient,346 while RAND explained “No effort at democratization has taken 
hold in less than five years”.347 In an attempt to temper the optimism of the Pentagon’s 
planners on the Defense Policy Board, Brookings’s Michael E. O’Hanlon noted in testimony 
before the House Armed Services Committee that U.S. involvement in Iraq, “would not be a 
short-term commitment.”348 O’Hanlon pointed to the occupations of West Germany and 
Japan as highlights of the “enormous success” made possible by “long-term U.S. commitments 
to regional reconstruction”.349 USIP went further, cautioning that, “The Untied States should 
brace for a long-term commitment in Iraq—perhaps even longer than the seven years required 
for the occupations in Japan and Germany.”350 The CIA argued “The Germany model offer 
[sic] better parallels for Iraq,” but maintained “implementation would require a large, extended 
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US military presence.”351 The CIA report later cautioned success in Iraq “could require a US 
role lasting a generation.”352 
Untimely Timing 
 
To analyze the effect of the think tank community’s proposals it is important to understand 
their timing with respect to the ongoing policy planning process. Those organizations that may 
have had an effect on the prewar reconstruction planning were those that contributed to the 
conversation by early 2003. We only have proof that RAND’s contribution was recognized by 
the administration, but it seems certain that any contributions later than February 2003 arrived 
too late to reasonably affect internal governmental planning processes. 
 
The conservative leaning American Enterprise Institute (AEI) was the first Washington think 
tank to begin discussion and analysis of a post-Saddam Iraq. On January 29, 2002, AEI hosted 
the first of several public fora to provide for discussion and analysis of “how to deal with Iraq 
as part of the war against terrorism.”353 A monthly AEI conference series titled “Planning for a 
Post-Saddam Iraq” began on October 3, 2002 and continued into 2005.354 The AEI events 
brought key members of the INC to Washington for presentations, debates, and a chance to 
shape policymakers’ understanding of the challenges facing a post-conflict Iraq. These events 
and briefings were key to shaping the policy debate, and granted Iraqi exiles from the INC a 
prime forum to address D.C. policymakers. Despite devoting unparalleled resources to Iraq-
themed policy events, AEI did not issue any comprehensive analysis or reports on the subject 
of postconflict reconstruction until planning for the ‘surge’ began in 2006 and 2007. The 
Stimson Center issued a brief report in October of 2002, but had no subsequent input into the 
evolving policy discussion. Instead, centrist think tanks were the first to enter the fray, with 
CFR/Baker and CSIS releasing extensive reports in January 2003, and RAND’s report 
following in March. All of these reports were under development since at least late 2002. 
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The ostensibly more liberal voices of the American establishment were unable to adequately 
articulate policy alternatives in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion; their British counterparts did 
not fare much better. Rosemary Hollis and Alex Danchev have explored how Prime Minister 
Tony Blair’s support for intervention outflanked the Conservative party, and robbed 
Parliament of any practical expression of opposition.355 On the American side, Democratic 
opposition was strong in the House, and but muted in the Senate; 40% of Democratic 
representatives and 58% of Democratic senators eventually voted to authorise the use of force 
in Iraq.356 Outside Congress, CEIP’s analysts entered the conversation with an op-ed in The 
Christian Science Monitor in mid-January 2003,357 but their first official reports did not appear 
until late March, too late to seriously affect the policy debate. USIP did not enter the 
conversation until April, after the launch of the invasion and too late to affect government 
planning. While Brookings staffers wrote prolifically in their opposition to the war, the 
Institute’s earliest contribution on postconflict planning did not appear until the summer of 
2003. 
 
One particularly glaring example of this trend comes from a speech given by Senior Brookings 
Fellow Roberta Cohen in late March 2003, nearly a week after the U.S. invasion commenced. 
Cohen criticized the placement of Garner’s ORHA within the Pentagon chain of command, a 
reality that had existed since at least January 20, 2003, when President Bush signed National 
Security Presidential Directive #24.358 Cohen argued such an institutional arrangement made it 
difficult for non-governmental and international organizations to cooperate with U.S. 
reconstruction efforts, as many organizations refused to operate under military authority, and 
others were denied access or information due to the classified nature of military operations. 
Cohen’s critiques were salient and prescient, but they came far too late to affect policy.359 
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By failing to enter the conversation earlier, the more progressive elements of the American 
establishment effectively ceded the discursive ground to their more conservative opponents. 
Hoping to stave off the administration’s push for war, the left-leaning think tanks failed to 
prepare for it. This limitation may be insurmountable: after all, how can one expect or 
encourage opponents of the invasion to develop plans for conducting it? Such a position would 
go against the inclinations of USIP, CEIP, and Brookings staffers, but also the mission 
statements of their respective institutions. Some suggestion for future policy conflicts may be 
found in the path taken by the more centrist contributors to the conversation. Both the CSIS 
and CFR-Baker reports profess to take no position on whether or not the United States should 
go to war in Iraq, but still manage to conduct serious and nuanced analysis into the subject of 
postconflict reconstruction in the event that such an invasion occurs. In the introductory 
paragraph of its report’s Executive Summary, CSIS notes sagely: 
 
If the United States goes to war with Iraq, winning the peace will be critical. This report 
takes no position on whether there should be a war. But, the success of any U.S.-led 
effort to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and drive Saddam Hussein from 
power will be judged more by the commitment to rebuilding Iraq after a conflict than 
by the military phase of the war itself.360 
 
The CFR report similarly disavows its own contribution to the postconflict planning debate.361 
Perhaps adopting a similar tactic would enable more progressive institutions, or those with 
more regional or technical experience, to enter the policy debate earlier, thereby increasing the 
effectiveness of their contributions and advancing their analysis beyond the level of cynical 
Monday morning quarterbacking.362 
A Contested Narrative:  Iraq and the Is lamic State  
 
This dissertation began with an overview of a theoretical debate in which scholars have 
grappled with the positionality of the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq within a 
broader discourse of intervention, postconflict reconstruction, and the liberal peace. Among 
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the most important conclusions of this work is the extent to which the lessons of postconflict 
reconstruction in Iraq remain contested. Lacklustre results in Iraq and Afghanistan have not 
caused U.S. policymakers to re-evaluate their understanding of the U.S. role in postconflict 
reconstruction. Rather, the case of Iraq is being absorbed into the existing conventional 
wisdom, with believers in postconflict reconstruction claiming Iraq was simply planned poorly, 
or was not met with the kind of resources and commitment that could have led to success. 
The Blame Game 
 
With barely a year passed since the tenth anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, popular 
understanding has coalesced around where blame should lie for the planning, selling, and 
mishandling of an unsanctioned war and its disastrous aftermath. With few exceptions, this 
blame has been placed squarely on the shoulders of key members of the Bush administration, 
most notably Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning Douglas Feith, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is portrayed as at worst complicit in 
Rumsfeld’s bureaucratic power games, or, more charitably, as simply an inefficient manager 
incapable of reigning in the more experienced Secretary of Defense.363 Secretary of State Colin 
Powell is blamed largely for his failure to organize the Department of State into any coherent 
form of opposition, with his reputation most clearly tarnished by his infamous speech in 
support of the administration’s disingenuous intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities. 
 
The successive release of tell-all documentaries regarding the preparation and execution of the 
war in Iraq continue to circle around the guilt of key decision makers. No End in Sight (2007), 
Hubris: Selling the Iraq War (2013), and the most recent addition, award-winning filmmaker 
Errol Morris’ The Unknown Known (2014), which attempts to delve into the mind of Donald 
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Rumsfeld.364 Along with PBS Frontline’s prolific documentation of the war, many journalists, 
filmmakers, and authors have delved into the memories and memoranda of key decision 
makers in an attempt to reveal where ultimate responsibility lies for actions that plunged the 
United States into strategic and tactical defeat. 
 
This thesis suggests that the policy failings underpinning the invasion and reconstruction of 
Iraq go far beyond merely the more conservative and hawkish elements of the Bush 
administration. While Mark Danner and Errol Morris have recorded unsettling anecdotes of 
the Bush Administration’s failings, members of Washington’s liberal establishment must be 
held in equal sanction. As Frank Rich has recently noted, the liberal media’s participation in 
the domestic “selling” of the Iraq War merits serious examination among the American 
establishment.365 Many key liberal thinkers and politicians were initially supportive of the 
administration’s policies, and there has been little to no consequence for their miscalculation. 
The numbers of leading policywonks who have retracted their previous statements are few, and 
the number of apologies issued even fewer. 
 
The pernicious tendency on the part of America’s elite to refrain from conceding the defeat of 
U.S. forces in Iraq is one of the clearest dangers of failing to understand Iraq’s relationship to 
the rest of history’s examples of state reconstruction. It is not surprising that architects of the 
invasion and its aftermath would hold to a different version of history, as Rumsfeld, Feith, and 
Cheney have recently been wont to do. Cheney has recently asserted “things were in good 
shape in Iraq” in advance of the U.S. withdrawal.366 In a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, 
Bremer blamed the current dissolution of order in Iraq on President Obama’s decision to 
withdraw U.S. troops, and called for the U.S. to make “a clear commitment to help restabilize 
Iraq”.367 Wolfowitz recently appeared on NBC’s “Meet the Press”, where he argued the current 
situation in Iraq could have been avoided if the U.S. had remained committed to Iraq just as it 
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“stuck with South Korea for 60 years”.368 Meanwhile, Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol 
appeared on ABC’s “This Week” to discuss the situation in Iraq, and Kristol and Frederick 
Kagan teamed up for an op-ed, “What to Do in Iraq,” wherein they argue for a return of U.S. 
troops to Iraq by claiming “Now is not the time to re-litigate either the decision to invade Iraq 
in 2003 or the decision to withdraw from it in 2011.”369 Blair and Feith have also placed their 
own calls for intervention.370 
 
It is revealing that even the war’s most virulent critics often stop short of naming the Iraq 
conflict an out-and-out defeat. Mark Danner, author of a recent evisceration of the Bush 
administration’s leadership, terms the war a “disaster”, “a catastrophe”, a “self-made 
quagmire,”371 but limits himself to claiming the war brought the United States to the “brink” 
or “verge of military defeat”, until the 2007 ‘surge’ aimed at “averting a complete debacle”.372 
Frank Rich, a virulent critic of the entire enterprise, terms the Iraq War a “wrong turn”, a 
“massive blunder”, a “debacle”, and a “fiasco” that “continues to pile up collateral damage and 
defeats daily”, but these appellations stop short of asserting defeat or loss.373 This avoidance on 
the part of the war’s most ardent critics to deliver the ultimate criticism is surprising, and it 
reveals the extent to which the memory of the Iraq War remains contested. 
 
The contested nature of the memory of the Iraq War has parallels with the U.S. memory of its 
experience in Vietnam, wherein two contradictory lessons have emerged: that interventions in 
absence of critical national interest are destined to fail, and that overwhelming force could 
have resulted in success. Gardner and Young have noted, “treating the Iraq War as a 
mismanaged effort with tragic consequences is stunningly like the conservative revisionist 
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argument about Vietnam.”374 At times this argument is even explicit. There is room for 
commentators such as Dan O’Shea, a former U.S. Navy SEAL with experience working on 
hostage rescue operations in Iraq, to claim that U.S. postwar policy in Iraq needed to take 
more from the German experience (commitment) and less from the Vietnam experience (cut-
and-run). O’Shea argues: 
 
But as history has taught us, successful postwar nation building takes decades — as it 
did in Germany, Japan, and South Korea — and often requires the continuous presence 
of US troops for just as long. In post–World War II Germany and Japan, and in South 
Korea following the 1953 armistice, the US established military bases that exist to this 
day. Today, Germany is the strongest economy in Europe, and Japan and Korea have 
long driven industry and innovation in Asia. The price of freedom and longterm 
stability in the world is an enduring commitment to political, economic, and military 
obligations. This history lesson was lost on our current national security team.375 
 
O’Shea’s conclusion raises questions about whether American collective memory will ever 
resolve the challenge of the Iraq War. “Vietnam-era vets often echoed a common refrain: “We 
were winning the war where I served and when I left,” O’Shea observes, “America's generation 
of Iraqi combat veterans feels much the same way.”376 O’Shea is not alone in his assessment. 
Bruce Thorton, writing for Frontpage Magazine, urges his audience to remember “that Japan’s 
and Germany’s democracies were built only after the occupying Allies had left both countries 
in ruins and millions dead”, yet bemoans the inconstant state of an American democracy 
“unsuited for the consistent, coherent, long-term foreign policy and intervention abroad 
required to nurture liberal democracy in other countries.” His arguments seems to be that if 
only Americans were more committed to the cause of freedom, American foreign policy and 
the effort to rebuild Iraq would have had more staying power, and thus achieved success.377 
Similar views are echoed in Foreign Policy, where Kori Schake bemoans the lack of a Marshall 
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Plan for Iraq,378 and even in Reuters, where a Special Report suggests the Obama administration 
“was not bold enough”, presenting the idea that had more attention been paid and more effort 
expended, the current situation in Iraq could have been avoided.379 Khong argues, “the final 
tragedy of Vietnam is that it has produced no common, unifying lesson that can be applied to 
future problems.”380 The discourse surrounding the Iraq War is following the same path. 
 
Some voices are rising to the top to question the lines of this debate, and confront a seemingly 
wilful misunderstanding of history, but as yet they are few. British historian Tony Judt once 
claimed the failure to confront failure in Iraq came from the “strange death” of America’s 
liberals.381 More recently, Stephen Walt has argued that too much liberalism is to blame.382 
Grandin lays blame at the feet of a “coalition made up of neoconservatives, Christian 
evangelicals, free marketers, and nationalists”383 which coalesced to lead the Republican Party 
under Reagan and the two presidents Bush. However, Grandin concedes the Democrats under 
Clinton and Obama are either unable, or unwilling, to articulate an alternative vision.384 
Recently retired as a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army, Daniel Bolger is now attempting to 
address this deficiency in the American discourse. His book (to be published on November 11, 
2014) is unceremoniously titled Why We Lost. Making a case for fighting limited incursions 
rather than extensive occupations, Bolger’s book bills itself as the first After Action Report on 
the failures of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Iraq.385 Bolger’s arguments for an AAR are 
valuable,386 but they also reinforce the strain of American foreign policy that imagines the 
answers required for the future are necessarily knowable from the past, as if a successful 
                                                
378 Kori Schake, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” Foreign Policy Magazine, 13 June 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/13/withdrawal_symptoms_iraq_war_mosul_obama. 
379 Warren Strobel, Missy Ryan, David Rohde and Ned Parker, “Special Report: How Iraq's Maliki defined limits 
of U.S. power,” Reuters, 30 June 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-iraq-security-maliki-
specialreport-idINKBN0F51HK20140630. 
380 Khong, Analogies at War, 259. 
381 Tony Judt, “Bush’s Useful Idiots,” London Review of Books, Vol. 28 No. 18 (21 September 2006): 3-5, 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n18/tony-judt/bushs-useful-idiots. 
382 Stephen Walt, “Democracy, Freedom, and Apple Pie Aren’t a Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Magazine, 01 July 
2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/01/american_values_are_to_blame_for_the_worlds_chaos_dem
ocracy_human_rights_ukraine_iraq?wp_login_redirect=0. 
383 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 5. 
384 Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 246. 
385 Mark Thompson, “A General Writes the First After-Action Report on the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: Why 
We Lost,” Time, 22 May 2014, http://time.com/109981/general-wars-afghanistan-iraq-why-we-lost/. 
386 Daniel Bolger, “Time for the Military to Take a Long, Hard Look,” Signal Online, 01 February 2014, 
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/12237. 
  99 
accumulation of ‘lessons learned’ is the only obstacle to successful postwar policy. As Williams 
has argued, “There is never an exact historical analogy that can be drawn, even if that is the 
best we have.”387 
Myths and ‘Lessons Learned’ 
 
Myths of victory and policy prescience have been allowed to masquerade as apolitical ‘lessons 
learned’, permitting U.S. policmakers to recycle failed historical initiatives in pursuit of 
contemporary objectives. This tendency was not limited to the case of the Iraq War. The 
occupation of Panama in 1989 was modelled upon the U.S. experience in Japan.388 So too, 
lessons from South Korea informed the U.S. experience in Vietnam,389 and ‘lessons learned’ 
from Vietnam in turn shaped U.S. policy in Central America under President Reagan.390 
Michèle Flournoy, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has praised the 
Department of Defense’s ability to collect ‘lessons learned’ from its operations, while critiquing 
the capacity of the remainder of the U.S. government (especially the Department of State) to 
do so.391 It is no surprise historical lessons were sought for the invasion and occupation of Iraq 
in 2003, but the inability of the United States to successfully analyze and critique such lessons 
should be disconcerting. Flournoy’s argument rests on the assumption that the lessons which 
are learned are always the right ones, and that having been ‘learned’ they will necessarily be 
available and applicable to future policy challenges. 
 
In practice, the lessons resuscitated from past conflicts and interventions have done more harm 
than good, as the more optimistic—and generally triumphalist—narratives exhibit more staying 
power than their cautionary and cynical cousins. This is part and parcel of what Tony Judt has 
called “voluntary amnesia”, or what E.P. Thompson termed “the enormous condescension of 
posterity.”392 The losers, and in many cases one’s own limitations, are forgotten. Just as Edward 
Peterson and Ray Moore’s cautionary accounts of state reconstruction in West Germany and 
Japan were subsumed into broader narratives of U.S. success, so too James Reed’s take on the 
Gulf War and Steven Peterson’s account of postwar efforts in Iraq have been gradually 
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marginalized within a discourse that prefers revising success to dwelling upon past failures. 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair once said of the conflict in Kosovo, “Success is the only exit 
strategy I am prepared to consider.”393 The American political establishment seems caught in 
the same bind, and this paucity of reflexivity continues into the present. 
 
The mythologized “Marshall Plan” has become the rhetorical commonplace for a postconflict 
success story, but the nuances and limits of that supposed ‘success’ are lost on the U.S. foreign 
policy elite. Patrick Christy, a Senior Policy Analyst at the conservative Foreign Policy Initiative 
recently penned an article for U.S. News and World Report arguing the postwar experience of the 
Marshall Plan should now be extended to new areas of U.S. strategic interest, including 
Africa.394 Ukraine has asked donors to fund its own “Marshall Plan”,395 while the President of 
Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández, and Foreign Minister Mireya Aguero, in turn requested 
the United States fund a “mini-Marshall Plan” for Central America to address the issues 
causing increased migration north towards the United States.396 Meanwhile, the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has calculated “by the end of 2014, the 
United States will have committed more funds to reconstruct Afghanistan, in inflation-
adjusted terms, than it spent on 16 European countries after World War II under the Marshall 
Plan.”397 While U.S. policymakers may be surprised at the lack of results in return for their 
investment, the previous discussion has shown why this surprise is unwarranted.  
 
Brownlee concludes with a continuation of Karl Deutsch’s metaphor, namely that “the U.S. 
has been more effective at refurbishing and strengthening an existing state than at laying a new 
foundation: it has done best where it has attempted less.”398 It is difficult to examine the cases 
of West Germany and Japan and to conclude that the United States attempted little in their 
rebuilding. Rather, much was expected of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and the initial intentions 
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of MacArthur and Clay were far from limited. A better observation is that those initial 
intentions were tempered by the reality they encountered, that U.S. and Allied postwar policy 
was marred by incoherence and inconsistency—and that Germany and Japan recovered from 
the aftermath of war despite this. The key lesson is not that state reconstruction projects have 
been more successful where the U.S. has attempted less. The key lesson is that reconstruction 
projects have been more successful where there was less to be done. 
History: Codas and the Pendulum 
 
Andrew Williams writes that the formation of a New World Order requires a coda, or a 
moment when “the relationship of past to present is thrown, temporarily at least, into sharp 
focus by a settling of accounts…a redrawing of the map and a building of a new tabula rasa 
upon which new hopes and aspirations can be erected.”399 On this basis, Williams concludes 
the post-9/11 international order is as much continuous with previous NWOs as not. Williams 
notes that President George H. W. Bush was cognisant of a sense of unfinishedness following 
the First Gulf War, wherein “it hasn’t been a clean end; there was no surrender on the 
battleship Missouri. This is what’s missing to make this akin to WWII, to separate Kuwait from 
Korea and Vietnam.”400 This question of codas speaks to the idea of a historical consensus, 
precisely the sort of consensus that marks U.S. thinking about postwar efforts in West 
Germany and Japan. It also tracks nicely with Khong’s discussion of historical analogy: 
 
the power of historical analogies is in part a function of how deeply ingrained they have 
become in the official and public mindset. When their lessons become part of the 
unspoken and spoken lore, when there is only one consensual interpretation, their 
premises and their relevance become matters of dogma that few will see fit to question. 
At that point, analogies step beyond their roles as heuristic devices for discovering facts 
and explanations and assume the roles of explanations and facts themselves.401 
 
One difficulty may be that while the memory of the post-World War II experience has achieved 
a modest consensus, the memory of subsequent conflicts in Vietnam (and now Iraq) seems 
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fated to continual contestation. In an attempt to bring the lessons of the Vietnam War to bear 
on Iraq, Gardner and Young claim, “history is too important to be left to the manipulations of 
Washington think-tank theorists and their sponsors.”402 The problem facing Gardner and 
Young’s account is that history cannot be quarantined, and academics have proven no better 
than the masses at achieving unanimity. History is constantly evolving and being reinterpreted; 
its lessons are neither static nor uncontested. The idea that one can ‘learn from history’, to 
which Gardner and Young dedicate their edited volume, presupposes an uncontested and 
static version of the human experience. But such a version of history, at least for the military 
adventures of the postwar world, does not appear to exist. This then is precisely the 
conundrum Blydenburg identified: memory “does not have to be the result of direct experience 
or observation, it does not have to be contemporary, and it can be entirely fabricated.”403 
 
The 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq seems destined to follow the path trod 
previously by the war in Vietnam—namely that multiple historical memories will arise to 
explain it. Williams has noted it is yet too early to pass final judgement on the curious mix of 
pre-emption, unilateralism, and neoliberal ideology known as the Bush Doctrine404 So too, the 
jury is still out on the Obama Doctrine, often rendered privately as “Don’t do stupid shit.”405 It 
has recently been charged that the current destabilization of Iraq is due to Obama’s cautious 
approach to the ongoing Syrian civil war. Most recently, Hillary Clinton (former Secretary of 
State and presumed 2016 presidential candidate) has argued for a more nuanced lesson from 
the Bush years, claiming “your stupid may not be mine, and vice versa.” Expressing support for 
a more proactive policy, she argued, “I think we’ve learned about the limits of our power to 
spread freedom and democracy. That’s one of the big lessons out of Iraq. But we’ve also 
learned about the importance of our power, our influence, and our values appropriately 
deployed and explained.” After establishing an essentialised dichotomy between the pre-
emptive policies of George W. Bush, and the cautious policies of Barack Obama, Clinton 
argued, “I think part of the challenge is that our government too often has a tendency to swing 
between these extremes. The pendulum swings back and then the pendulum swings the other 
                                                
402 Gardner and Young, “Introduction,” 15. 
403 Blydenburg, “Memory and Power,” 852. 
404 Williams, Failed Imagination? 284. 
405 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Hillary Clinton: 'Failure' to Help Syrian Rebels Led to the Rise of ISIS,” The Atlantic, 10 
August 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/hillary-clinton-failure-to-help-syrian-
rebels-led-to-the-rise-of-isis/375832/?single_page=true. 
  103 
way.”406 Clinton clearly sees herself as occupying the middle ground, but to what end? This 
dissertation has shown the danger an unnuanced consensus view of history can be to 
policymaking, but what effect might an irrevocably contested history have? Can policymaking 
born out of the ‘lessons’ of Vietnam and Iraq have a greater chance of success than those of the 
Second World War? 
 
It would be easy to leave this conclusion overly pessimistic: to end with the admonishment that 
if even history is ultimately contestable, then historically-minded policy has little productive to 
say about anything. But this attempt to revise our understanding of history is not a new 
endeavour. Gimbel’s cautionary revision of Western ‘success’ in postwar Germany came as 
early as 1968, to be followed by Yergin (1978), and Moore’s addition on Japan (1979). Their 
efforts were followed by Milward (1984) and Kades (1989), with Abelshauser (1991), Khong 
(1992), and Reed (1993) representing the historical revisionism (or neo-revisionism) of the 
1990s. Jackson’s critical account of West Germany’s reconstruction came in 2006, and 
Grandin’s volume on reconstruction in Latin America was issued in 2010. Now Bolger will 
bring his narrative of Iraq to the table in 2014, and thus the process will continue. These 
authors encourage humility where there has been too much hubris, granting us the critical 
description that “makes us look again” at that which has become overly familiar.407  
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